Latinos in the Western United States:
Trends and Patterns

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Of the four Census Regions, the West is the largest in terms of land area and the most diverse with respect to topography and climate. The bulk of the region came into the United States via treaties enacted in the mid-19th century. In 1846, Britain and the United States signed the Treaty of Oregon, which established the 49th parallel as the as the border with Canada for lands west of Lake of the Woods, Minnesota. Territories to the south of this line eventually became the states of Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington. In 1848, after its defeat in the Mexican American War, Mexico was compelled to sign the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, ceding the northern 40% of its territory to the United States, eventually giving rise to the present-day states of New Mexico, Arizona, California, Colorado, Utah, and Nevada.

Three additional territorial acquisitions in the latter half of the 19th century completed the geographic formation of the Western Region. In the Gadsden Purchase in 1854. the United States acquired additional territory west of the Rio Grande River and south of the Gila River to incorporate additional Mexican territory into Southern Arizona, thereby creating a route for a southern line for the transcontinental railroad. In 1867, U.S. Secretary of State William Seward negotiated the purchase of Alaska from the Russian Empire; and finally in 1898 Congress passed legislation authorizing annexation of the Hawaiian Islands as U.S. territories.

These acquisitions brought the total land mass of the West to 1.9 million square miles, more than twice the size of the South, the next largest region. Its topography ranges from the depths of Death Valley (-282 feet below sea level) to the heights of Mount Denali (23,310 feet above sea level) with ecologies that extend from balmy tropics to frigid tundra. This diverse array of territories joined the union at different times. California entered first in 1850, followed by Oregon (1959), Nevada (1853), Colorado (1876), Montana and Washington (1889), Idaho and Wyoming (1890), Utah (1896), and Arizona and New Mexico (1912). Alaska and Hawaii did not become states until 1959, finally bringing the nation's territorial expansion to an end.

LATINO ORIGINS IN THE WEST

Upon the West Census Region's formation in the mid-19th century, two-thirds of all those we today consider Latinos lived within it. Apart from California and New Mexico, the new lands were very sparsely settled by people of European origin (Indians were typically not counted in censuses of the time) and Latinos were not much in evidence outside these two states. According to the 1850 U.S. Census, 21% of Latinos lived in the California and 79% inhabited New Mexico, virtually all former citizens of Mexico.

The demographic history of the West's Latino population began long before 1850, however. Indeed, it goes back to 1598, when the Spaniard Juan de Oñate arrived in New Mexico with some 500 soldiers, settlers, and priests to establish the first European settlement in that region, which he christened San Juan de los Caballeros (Simmons 1992). Located in a small valley near the Charma River, a tributary of the Rio Grande, the new settlement served as the initial northern anchor for an inland (as opposed to coastal) Camino Real, a rough roadway that connected New Mexico to the rest of the Viceroyalty of New Spain based in Mexico City.

Although the Rio Grande River has long served as the border between Texas and Mexico, it bends northward at El Paso and passes through the center of New Mexico to headwaters in

southern Colorado. The river and its tributaries flow southward through a series of valleys dotted with indigenous settlements known as Pueblos that were established in the 14th century, long before the arrival of the Spanish. In addition to the Pueblos, the region at that time was also inhabited by warlike nomadic groups such as the Comanche and Apache. These tribes practiced a mobile horse-based culture that evolved in the Southwest and Great Plains after the Spanish introduced equines into the region in the early 1500s (Ewers 1955). Horses greatly enhanced the effectiveness in hunting large game, but also supported a militaristic culture that preyed upon the sedentary indigenous agrarian communities in New Mexico's riverine valleys, including those later established by Europeans.

The initial settlement at San Juan de los Caballeros proved vulnerable to raids by these nomads, and in 1610 much of the population relocated to the newly founded colonial capital of Santa Fe, situated in a more defensible position at the base of the Cristo de Sangre Mountains (McNitt 1972). Despite disclaimers from the clergy, the principal goal of Spanish colonists was not the salvation of the indigenous peoples, but more centrally their exploitation for the material benefit of the settlers. Within New Mexico, secular and religious authorities initially competed to control the labor of the native Pueblo dwellers whose labor was critical to extracting the region's wealth. Franciscan missionaries ultimately prevailed in this competition and gained political as well as ecclesiastical control over the Pueblos.

Their treatment of the Indians was no better than that of viceroyal officials, however, triggering a violent Pueblo revolt in 1680 that drove Spanish colonists out of all but the southernmost portion of the New Mexico, near the present-day city of El Paso, Texas (Ponce 2002). It was not until 1692 that Diego de Vargas returned with a regiment of soldiers to restore Spanish rule, ultimately surrounding the rebellious Pueblo forces in Santa Fe and forcing them to surrender (Knaut 1995). In negotiating the terms of their surrender, however, the indigenous leaders extracted concessions from the Spaniards, including a substantial land grant to each of the Pueblos, 19 of which survive to this day.

The restoration of colonial authority brought peace and spurred the arrival of new settlers from central Mexico. These newcomers founded the City of Albuquerque in 1706, named in horror of the New Spain's viceroy, Francisco Fernández de la Cueva, the 10th Duke of Albuquerque (García Purón 1984). The peace was cut short, however, by the rise after 1719 of a tribal confederation of Comanche groups known as the Comanchería. For a time, this confederation dominated the region militarily, raiding native and Spanish settlements alike, taking horses, livestock, materiel, and captives who could be profitably ransomed (Hamalainen 2008).

The resulting violence forced the abandonment of several Spanish settlements before the conflict came to a head in 1778, when 127 Spaniards and Pueblo Indians were killed by a Comanche raiding party (Kenner 1969). In response, the governor of New Mexico in 1779 organized a punitive expedition of 560 soldiers to confront the tribe. This force tracked the Comanche to an encampment near present day Pueblo, Colorado, and in a surprise attack killed tribe's preeminent war leader, prompting the group to sue for peace with the New Mexican government (though not the neighboring government in Texas), a peace endured until U.S. annexation in 1848 (John 1975).

With peace came another burst of population growth. According to estimates by Fowler (2000), at the outset of the colonial period in 1600 the population of New Mexico included just 700 Spaniards and some 80,000 Puebla dwellers. By 1749 the Spanish population had grown to 4,353 but the Pueblo population dropped to 10,658 owing to the spread of infectious diseases for which the Indians lacked immunity. By 1800, the Spanish population had risen to 19,276 while the Pueblo population had fallen to 9,732. The War of Independence erupted in 1810 and culminated with Spain's recognition of Mexican sovereignty in 1821. On the eve of independence in 1820, Fowler (2000) estimated New Mexico's population to include 28,436 Spaniards and 9,923 Pueblo dwellers.

In the last estimate before annexation by the United States, in 1842 Fowler put the respective numbers of Spaniards and Pueblo Indians at 46,988 and 16,498, for a total of 63,498 inhabitants. Eight years later, the U.S. Census of 1850 registered a total population of 61,544, including some 60,022 Latinos and 1,522 others, all listed as White, with most of the territory's indigenous residents remaining uncounted. The Latinos of New Mexico thus comprised a Spanish-speaking society that had only been Mexican for 27 years, and many of those in New Spain's most remote province still considered themselves to be more Spanish than Mexican.

The colonization of California began much later than in New Mexico. Although the Spanish sea captain Juan Rodríguez Cabrillo reached San Diego Bay in 1542 and Sebastián Vizcaíno anchored off the coast of Monterrey in 1602, Spanish colonization of what is now the State of California did not begin until 1769 when Gaspar de Portolá founded the Presidio of San Diego as a military fort near a small native encampment known as Cosoy, with the Franciscan priest Junípero Serra establishing the Mission San Diego de Alcalá nearby (Leffingwell 2005). Unlike New Mexico, the indigenous inhabitants of California did not live in sedentary agrarian Pueblos, but instead were hunters and gathers who survived by harvesting the land's flora and hunting its fauna (Lightfoot and Parrish 2009).

Spanish settlers began arriving in 1774 and the village of Cosoy soon became the Pueblo of San Diego and eventually today's city of that name. From 1769 to 1823, Spanish colonization moved steadily northward with the successive founding of 21 missions, each roughly a day's ride from the next. The last mission to be founded, San Francisco Solano, opened in Sonoma in 1823, two years after Mexican independence. In addition to the Presidio of San Diego, three other forts were built, one each in Monterrey (1771), San Francisco (1776), and Santa Barbara (1782). Pueblos were officially chartered in San Jose (1777), Los Angeles (1781), Branciforte (1797), and Sonoma (1835), with Brancifote eventually giving rise to the City of Santa Cruz. Although these four communities were founded as Pueblos, other settlements emerged spontaneously around the missions and were eventually recognized as Pueblos.

At the time of Mexican independence in 1821, the population living in and around California's missions consisted of just 21,196 persons (Archibald 1978:154). With independence, Alta California became a territory of Mexico rather than a state in that nation's new federal system. It encompassed not just present-day California but also lands that are now parts of the states of Nevada, Utah, and Arizona. The population, however, remained clustered along California's Pacific coast. During the colonial period, Spanish authorities made a small

number of land grants to soldiers, government functionaries, and relatives of high officials to establish a series of large, privately held *ranchos*. After independence, ecclesiastical and royal properties were privatized and by 1846 more than 800 ranchos had been created via land grants from (Engstrand 1985).

Mexico's new government sought to populate its sparsely settled northern territories through a Colonization Law enacted in 1824, offering generous land grants to immigrants who promised to improve and work the land. Additional legislation enacted in 1828 authorized state governors to grant "vacant" lands to individuals and families for the purpose of habitation and cultivation (Engstrand 1985). The amount of land available for transfer was dramatically increased in 1833 when legislation secularized California's Franciscan mission system and authorized the governor to confiscate and redistribute church properties, which was accomplished in 1834 (Phillips 1974).

California's population grew steadily in the ensuing years as land grants attracted settlers both Mexican and foreign, including many from the United States. The influx of White Americans naturally accelerated after annexation in 1848 and boomed with the discovery of gold at Sutter's Mill in 1849. The 1850 Census listed 92,597 inhabitants, with 83% being non-Hispanic Whites and just 16% Mexicans, in contrast to the 1850 Census of New Mexico which reported its 61,544 residents to be 97.5% Mexican and just 2.5% non-Hispanic White.

The West's two inaugural Latino populations thus entered the United States under very different circumstances. Latinos in New Mexico had deep Spanish roots going back 250 years (with only 29 spent nominally as Mexicans). They also constituted the overwhelming majority of state residents and defined themselves primarily in opposition to the indigenous Pueblo inhabitants Pueblos rather than the tiny population of Anglo-Americans. In contrast, the of Latino roots of California went back a mere 52 years (only half of which were spent as Mexicans). Latinos constituted a small minority of the total population and were dominated by a politically ascendant Anglo-American majority that treated Mexicans as racial inferiors.

In the years immediately after 1850, Latinos in New Mexico continued to constitute a majority of the state's population. As of 1900, their share stood at 51%, but owing to a burst of Anglo-American in-migration over the ensuing decade, the percentage fell to 36% in 1910. Although the Latino population revived briefly to peak at 42% in 1930, thereafter it fell for two more decades to reach an all-time low of 30% in 1950.

Although California was around 17% Latino when it entered the union as a state, the share fell sharply over the ensuing decades to reach a minimum value of just 3.9% in 1900. With the onset of large-scale immigration from Mexico in 1907, the percentage rose back up to 8.2% in 1930 before falling to 7.7% in 1940 owing to mass deportations during the Great Depression. As White migrants entered en masse from elsewhere in the United States during and after the Second World War, the percentage slid further to 7.5% in 1950 before moving upward as immigration from Mexico picked up during the 1950s and 1960s.

Latino populations emerged in other Western states at different times in the decades after 1850. In the census samples assembled by the IPUMS project, Latinos appear first in the 1860

census of the present states of Arizona, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington, with 98% identified as Mexicans and 78% employed as workers either in mining or agriculture, about evenly split between the two (Ruggles et al. 2022). During the period 1870-1900, the number of Latino-hosting states was enlarged with the appearance of small populations in Nevada in 1870, Montana in 1880, and in Utah and Wyoming in 1900. In these states, however, only 60% of Latinos were Mexican, with 16% being Chilean, 12% Peruvian, and 9% Spanish.

By 1910, Latinos had come to occupy all states of the West, with the appearance of Latinos in the censuses of Alaska, Hawaii, and Idaho. Hawaii stands out among states in the West in that Mexicans comprised a tiny share of its initial Latino population (just 2.1%), which was dominated by Puerto Ricans (63.7%) and Spaniards (30.2%). Puerto Ricans were recruited to work in the territory's sugarcane industry beginning around 1900 (Whalen 2005), and indeed 82.6% of all Puerto Rican workers enumerated in Hawaii that year were in agriculture, as were 65.5% of Spaniards, most of whom were likely also from Puerto Rico given the recency of the island's capture from Spain (in 1898).

LATINO POPULATION GROWTH SINCE 1970

Data from the 2020 Census of Population reveal the West to contain the largest Latino population of the four census regions with 23.6 million Latino residents, just ahead of the South with 22.7 million, followed by the Northeast at 8.8 million, and the Midwest with just under 6.0 million. As shown in Figure 1, the West's Latino population experienced very rapid growth over the past five decades, rising from 3.5 million in 1970 to 23.6 million in 2020, for an annual growth rate of 3.8%. During the 1970s the growth rate was spectacular at 5.7% per year. Growth continued at a very rapid pace during the 1980s and 1990s with respective annual rates of 4.6% and 4.3%; but it slowed 3.0% per year after 2000 and dropped further to 1.4% between 2010 and 2020.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

The West's Latino population grew by around 25 million persons between 1970 and 2020. As a result of this demographic expansion, Latinos steadily rose as a percentage of the West's total population. As shown in Figure 2, the percentage Latino climbed from 9.7% in 1970 to 34.7% in 2020. The increments were especially notable in the 1970s, 1990s, and 2010s when the shares increased by 5.7 points, 5.2 points, and 6.1 points, respectively, compared to 3.7 points in the 1980s and 4.3 points in the early 2000s.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

Figure 3 shows the 2020 census population of Latinos in each state within the West Census Region. These data make plain that Latino population growth was not evenly distributed across western states. With 15.6 million Latino residents in 2020, the bulk of the growth obviously unfolded in California. The next closest state was Arizona with 2.2 million Latino residents, followed by Colorado with 1.3 million and then New Mexico and Washington with just over a million each. In no other state did the 2020 Latino population exceed one million. Nevada came closest with around 890,000 Latino residents, followed by Oregon with 689,000

Latinos, Utah with 493,000, Idaho with 239,00, and Hawaii with 138,000. As of 2020, however, the number of Latinos in Alaska, Montana, and Wyoming did not even reach 100,000 persons in absolute terms.

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

The *relative* number of Latinos in each state is indicated by their percentage of the total population, and this information is presented in Figure 4. Even using this, however, the Latino populations of Alaska, Montana, and Wyoming were very small in 2020. The smallest Latino percentage was found in Montana (4.2%), followed in ascending order by Alaska (5.8%), Wyoming (10.2%), and Hawaii (9.5%). In contrast, by 2020 New Mexico had climbed back from its earlier 1950 minimum to within shouting distance of a majority (47.7%). In California, Arizona, and Nevada the respective Latino shares in 2020 were 39.4%, 30.7%, and 28.7, followed by Colorado at 21.9%. Idaho, Oregon, Utah, and Washington all had Latino percentages clustered around 13%-14%, with respective figures of 13.0%, 13.9%, 15.1%, and 13.7%. Latinos constituted around a tenth of the population in Hawaii (9.5%) and Wyoming (10.2%).

FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

The next two displays reveal how Latino populations in the various states arrived at the foregoing absolute and relative numbers by 2020. Figure 5 begins by comparing California's trajectory of Latino population growth from 1900 through 2020 to that of all other Western states combined. Very clearly the rise of the Latino population in the West is a story of California versus the rest of the region. From 1900 to 1940 we see little difference between the growth trajectory of California and that prevailing across the rest of the region. From 1940 onward, however, we see the gap between the two curves steadily widen until by 2020 California's Latino population is almost twice the size of the combined Latino population of all other Western states (1.94 times greater).

FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE

Figure 6 presents the 1900-2020 Latino population growth trajectories for the 12 other Western states besides California, clearly revealing Alaska, Montana, and Wyoming to be laggards throughout the entire period, with flat trajectories that produced populations that ranged from 45,000 to 60,000 in 2020. This interval cannot even be depicted on the graph given the range of the y-axis, which must accommodate the standout growth of Arizona. From 1900 to 1960 the trajectories of Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico are similar, as all three states pull away from the rest of the pack. During this early period New Mexico consistently evinced the largest Latino population outside of California. Between 1960 and 1970, however, the number of Latinos in New Mexico declined as growth in Colorado and Arizona surged, with the latter state displacing New Mexico in 1980 as the West's largest Latino population outside of California.

FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE

Although growth of New Mexico's Latino population resumed after 1970 (and in 1980 almost came to equal that of Arizona's), it never reclaimed the status of the West's largest Latino

population outside of California. After 1990, the trajectory of growth shot dramatically upward in Arizona and Colorado relative to New Mexico. In Arizona, especially, the Latino population nearly doubled from 1990 to 2000 (going from 666,000 to 1.3 million). Although Colorado's growth turned upward after 1990 as well, its growth support was not as dramatic, with "only" a 75% increase from 1990 to 2000 (from 421,000 to 736,000). Thereafter Arizona's lead over Colorado and the rest of the pack only increased as its Latino population climbed to 2.2 million in 2020, compared to just 1.3 million in Colorado.

Washington, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and to a lesser extent Idaho also displayed a remarkable acceleration of Latino population growth after 1990 led by Washington, which shot upward from 205,000 in that year to nearly 1.1 million Latinos in 2020. The abrupt upward shift of Latino population growth in these states likely reflects the escalation of border enforcement after 1990, fueled by the launching of Operation Blockade in El Paso in 1993 and Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego in 1994. The number of Border Patrol Officers grew from 3,700 to 21,000 officers between 1990 and 2010). Over the same period, the Border Patrol's budget rose from $263 million to 2.1 billion (Massey 2015).

This unprecedented increase in the U.S. border enforcement effort, and its initial concentration in the two busiest sectors for unauthorized border crossing, had two important consequences (Massey 2020). First, it channeled migrants away from heavily fortified sectors around El Paso and San Diego toward new crossing points in the Sonoran Desert on the border with Arizona, sharply increasing migratory traffic through and settlement in that state. Second as explicitly envisioned by the Border Patrol's strategic plan for 1994 and beyond (U.S. Border Patrol 1994), rising border enforcement also increased the costs and risks of border crossing. According to data compiled by the Mexican Migration Project (see Massey, Durand, and Pren 2016) between 1990 and 2000 the average cost of a clandestine crossing rose from $642 to $1,830 and the number of crossing deaths jumped from 80 to 380. In response to the rising costs and risks, migrants did the logical thing: they minimized border crossing, not by remaining in Mexico but by staying longer in the United States to avoid those facing those costs and risks on a later trip.

The ultimate effect of rising border enforcement was thus to reduce the rate of return migration back to Mexico while leaving the rate of unauthorized entry unchanged, increasing the net inflow of undocumented migrants to accelerate undocumented population growth and yield a boom in the Mexican and Central American populations, a surge that was especially visible in Arizona and Colorado (Massey and Capoferro 2008; Massey and Pren 2012). Although as shown in Figure 6, Latino population growth in Washington, Nevada, Oregon, and Idaho began to grow in 1970, these states also experienced clear upturns in their growth trajectories after 1990, most notably Washington and Nevada, less in Oregon and Utah, and least in Idaho. Hawaii's population growth unsurprisingly remained constant from 1970 onward with no uptick after 1990, given that travel to the islands entailed transoceanic travel rather than simply movement across a land border and was thus unaffected by rising border enforcement.

TRENDS IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE LATINO POPULATION

Not only was the number of Latinos living the West changing dramatically from 1970 to 2020, so were their characteristics with respect to a variety of social and economic dimensions, ranging from basic demographic characteristics, ranging from basic demographic factors such as age, sex, and race to more complex societal variables such as education, occupation, and income. Moving beyond simple numbers, in this section we turn to changes over time in the composition and character of Latinos in the West.

Demographics and Racial Identification

Figure 7 offers a demographic profile of Latinos in the West Census Region from 1970 through 2020. Notable trends include a steady rise in the mean age of the Latino population, a decline in the share of married Latinos and a corresponding increase in the percent never married. We also observe a decline in the number of births to women of childbearing age from 2.9 in 1970 to 1.4 in 2000 with little change thereafter. The share of females in the population remained close 50% throughout the period, with a slight dip down to 48.9% in 2000, possibly reflecting the progressive settlement of undocumented Mexican males (who used to circulate back and forth) in response to the militarization of the border, which might also help to explain the increasing share never married and the rising average age (as former circular migrants increasingly settled in the United States to age in place). Of course, a rising average age is also a consequence of declining rates of Latina fertility in preceding years.

FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE

The main finding to emerge from the foregoing diagram is the steady increase in the average age of Latinos. Figure 8 examines trends in the racial identity reported by Latinos, a fraught variable to capture accurately for both methodological and conceptual reasons. Methodologically, from 1970 to 2020 neither race nor Hispanic origin was consistently measured in either the decennial census or government surveys; and there was an especially large shift in the format of the race question between 2010 and 2020. In addition, although race has been included on the decennial census since 1790, the item capturing Hispanic origin was only introduced in 1970 and its wording changed in important ways across the decades.

FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE

Conceptually, the measurement racial identity among Latinos is further complicated by the fact that race is viewed differently in Latin America compared with the United States. In Latin America race is generally seen a continuum of color mediated by social class rather than a binary defined on the basis of a categorical one-drop rule (Telles 2004). Despite this looser and more fluid conceptualization, skin color stratification nonetheless prevails throughout the region and like the United States, Latin American societies constitute "pigmentocracies" in which those with lighter skin tones are systematically advantaged (Telles 2014).

Although the census race question has long had a write-in option, the way write-ins are coded has changed substantially over time in ways that matter to Latinos. In 1970 and 1980, if

Latinos wrote in terms such as Mestizo or Boricua to signal mixed racial origins, the response was recoded as White. In 1990, however, these responses allowed to stand and were included in the "Other Race" category. In addition, from 1970 through 1990 census respondents were instructed to select only *one* category in answering the race question, whereas from 2000 onward they were instructed to pick *one or more* racial categories.

Finally, within U.S. society Latinos and especially Mexicans have been subjected to an intensive process of racialization since 1965 built around the trope of illegality, as reflected in the rise of an unauthorized population, making a growing share of Mexicans and Central Americans technically "illegal" and thus easily framed as criminals, lawbreakers, and a threat to society (Massey 2014). This framing reached its apogee during the Trump Administration (Menjívar 2021).

In addition, during the 1980s and 1990s the term "people of color," which had not been in common use among Americans since the Civil War, reentered the vernacular, first among Black intellectuals, feminists, and progressives and later spreading to the press and the public (Starr 2022). During the period 1960-1985, for example, the term "people of color" was referenced just four times per year in the *New York Times*, but the frequency jumped to 48 times per year during 1986-1999 (Star 2022). The term is now widely recognized as a catch-all category embracing not just persons of African descent but also Latinos and many Asians, indicating the emergence of what Pérez (2021) calls a distinct "person-of-color identity."

In keeping with the multiple technical changes in the measurement of race and Hispanic origin, the significant differences in the conceptualization of race in Latin and Anglo America, and salient shifts in the perception of race within U.S. society itself, Figure 8 unsurprising reveals a great deal of instability in the expression of racial identity among Latinos between 1970 and 2020. In 1970 and 1980, over 90% of Latinos were identified as White, though we cannot know the extent to which this reflects the actions of Census Bureau coders rather than the responses of Latinos themselves.

Between 1980 and 1990 the share identified as white dropped from around 92% to 52% as the share reporting some other race rose from 4% to 43%, reflecting the change in census coding rules but possibly also indicating a true shift in racial self-identification. The share reporting themselves as another race remained constant from1990 to 2000, but the percent identifying as White dipped from 52% to 48% and the share reporting a multiracial identity rose from zero to around 6% reflecting the new instructions that encouraged the reporting of "one or more" races. Nonetheless, in 2010 self-identification as white rebounded to 64% as the share reporting another race fell to 28%.

From 2010 to 2020 we observe a major shift away from White identity among Latinos. As of 2020, only a fifth of Latinos reported themselves to be White, an all-time low. In contrast, the share reporting a multiracial identity rose from 5% to 33% and the share identifying as being of some other race increased from 28% to 42%. Throughout the period from 1970 to 2020 tiny percentages of Latinos reported themselves to be Indigenous, Black, or Asian. The major finding to emerge from the most recent census is that three-quarters of Latinos now perceive themselves to be nonwhite.

Whether this remarkable shift reflects the adoption of a people-of-color identity by Latinos or a reaction to the rise in White nationalism or is simply an artifact of changes in the wording and organization of the census race item, cannot easily be determined. In 2020, for the first time, respondents were not only instructed to select one or more races. In addition, each major racial category was accompanied by a space for a write-in specification along with an instruction to "mark X in one or more boxes **AND** print origins" (capitalization and bolding in original). But examples given as part of the instruction differed sharply from those used in the past and were quite different from group to group.

Those reporting themselves to be White, for example, were instructed to "print, for example, German, Irish, English, Italian, Lebanese, Egyptian, etc." For Blacks the instructions were to "print, for example, African American, Jamaican, Haitian, Nigerian, Ethiopian, Somali, etc. In addition to predetermined categories such as Chinese and Japanese, Asians selecting the Other Asian option were told to "print, for example, Pakistani, Cambodian, Hmong, etc." Likewise, those selecting Other Pacific Islander were instructed to "print, for example, Tongan, Fijian, Marshallese, etc."

Beginning with the 2000 census, the Hispanic Origin item had been placed immediately before the race item on the census form, but in 2020 a new instruction was added: "**NOTE: Please answer BOTH Question 8 about Hispanic origin and Question 9 about race. For this census, Hispanic origins are not races**" (bolding and capitalization in original). It is not clear why Irish and German constitute examples of specific races for Whites and why Jamaican and Nigerian represent separate races for Blacks, but Mexican and Puerto Rican are not considered legitimate races for Latinos. Setting that conundrum aside, the most important change were to the instructions that accompanied the space set aside for American Indians in writing in their tribe, which asked respondents to "print name of enrolled or principal tribe(s), for example, Navajo Nation, Blackfeet Tribe, **Mayan, Aztec**, Native Village of Barrow Inupiat Traditional Government, Nome Eskimo Community, etc." (bolding added).

The foregoing list is significant, for it includes Aztec and Maya, the two most salient Indigenous identities in Mexico, which are not only universally recognized there but also well-known in Central America (especially the Maya) and even South America. Many Latin Americans perceive themselves to be descendants of both Indigenous and Spanish forebearers, and this could well have induced many Latinos not just to identify themselves as Mestizo or Boricua, but to list themselves as being of two races White (specifying Spanish) and American Indian (specifying Aztec, Mayan, or another of the many Indigenous groups that populate Latin America).

National and Regional Origins

Although trends in the racial identity of Latinos may be complicated to interpret, changes over time in the regional origins of Latinos in the West are much clearer. As shown in Figure 9, across the five decades from 1970 to 2020 Mexicans have always constituted by far the largest component of the West's Latino population. Although their share fell from 88% to 75% between 1970 and 1980, thereafter it never dropped any further. The share rose slightly to 78.7% during

the 1980s, fell slightly to 75.7% in the 1990s, increased back up to 81.5% in 2010, and then fell back to 76.6% in in 2020. At that date, Other Latinos comprised 9.2% of the population and Central Americans made up 7.8%, with South Americans coming in at 3.0%, Puerto Ricans at 2.2%, and Cubans at just 0.9%, At just 0.3% of the total, the share of Dominicans is too small to be depicted in the diagram.

FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE

With the exception of marital status (shown in Figure 7), all of the information presented in this report so far come from data gathered on the short form of the census administered to all households in the United States. No census is perfect, and the quality of the numeration inevitably varies from year to year. Compared to earlier censuses, the 2020 census was administered under conditions that posed unusually difficult challenges. In 2016, Donald Trump campaigned for and won the U.S. presidency on an explicitly nativist, racist platform that demonized Latinos in general and Mexicans in particular. In announcing his candidacy, Trump told viewers that Mexicans were "bringing crime; they're rapists;" and that "it's coming from more than Mexico. It's coming from all over South and Latin America."

In March of 2018, on the eve of the date at which the content of the 2020 census was to be finalized, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross suddenly and unexpectedly announced the Trump administration's intention to move the citizenship question from the ACS to the short form, in violation of the Census Bureau's own procedures, its Statistical Quality Standards, the provisions of the 1790 Census Act as amended in 2002, and prior Supreme Court decisions. It later emerged that this gambit originated in conversations between anti-immigrant activists Stephen Bannon and Kris Kobach and was likely intended to frighten immigrants and discourage their participation in the 2020 census.

Although the effort was blocked in federal court, it served its purpose by frightening Latino immigrants, especially those present without authorization. This fear mongering came at a time when the census itself was making a major shift from a mail-out to web-based enumeration platform, one that had experienced problems in earlier testing, raising fears of a significant census undercount in 2020. These fears were exacerbated by the eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic on the eve of the April 1 census date, which disproportionately hit the Latino population owing to its concentration in low-status jobs deemed "essential" in agriculture health, and various other service industries (Goldman et al. 2021)

Despite these worries, in the spring of 2022, the Census Bureau announced a net census undercount rate of just 0.24% in a press release stating that "the quality of the 2020 Census total population count is consistent with that of recent censuses" (U.S. Census Bureau 2022). This overall favorable result nonetheless reflects a counterbalancing of overcounts and undercounts spread across different racial and ethnic groups. Latinos experienced the highest undercount rate of 5.p%, followed by Blacks at 3.3%, compared to overcounts of 1.6% and 2.6% for non-Hispanic Whites and Asians, respectively.

Although the damage to the census may have been somewhat contained, undercount rates were much worse on the 2020 American Community Survey (ACS), which since 2000 has

replaced the long form census as the principal source for detailed data during census years (i.e. all data beyond name, place of residence, relation to respondent, birthdate, age, gender, Hispanic origin, and race). The 2020 ACS was administered to a sample of some 1.41 million households, about 1% of the total population and the Public Use Microdata Sample was released in March of 2022.

A systematic analysis by Warren (2022) suggests that the 2020 ACS substantially undercounted noncitizen Latino immigrants, with the rate ranging from 4% among Mexicans to 14% among Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, and Hondurans, with respective rates of 23% and 24% for Cubans and Guatemalans, and Peruvians and Argentineans coming in at 11% and 19%, respectively. The ACS 2020 data reported in subsequent displays must therefore be interpreted with some caution, as they are likely to underrepresent important segments of the Latino population, notably Central American and Caribbean immigrants, especially those most recently arrived and were present without authorization.

Immigration, Language, and Citizenship

Figure 10 presents estimates of the percentage of immigrants who arrived in the five years prior to the census. The data for 1970 through 2000 come from the long form of the census that went to a 15%-20% sample of census respondents, the data for 2010 come from the combined 2009-2011 ACS samples (about 2% of the US population), while the 2020 come from the single 2020 ACS sample (1% of the population). The reliability and validity of results will likely be improved when the 2019-2021 three ACS datafile becomes available, but as already noted results from the 2020 should be interpreted with caution.

FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE

The figure clearly reveals a surge in immigration from Central and South America that occurred between 1970 and 2000. The share of recent arrivals from Central America rose from 8.2% to 42.9% between 1970 and 1980, dropped back to 17.3% in 27.3% in 1990 and went down to 12.7% in 2000, reaching 8.1% in 2010. Among South Americans the progression was from 11.6% to 26.2% between 1970 and 1980 and then down to 20.5%, 14.1%, and 7.5% in 1990, 2000, and 2010. Mexican immigration also increased but much more modestly and with a peak in 1990 rather 1980, reaching 12.3% in that year after rising from 2.2% in 1970 to 10.4% in 1980. Thereafter the share of recent arrivals drops to 9.8% in 2000 and 3.6% in 2010.

Across these same dates, immigration by Other Latinos remained low and flat while the percentage of recently arrived Cubans fell from 16.5% in 1970 to bottom out at just 1.6% in 1990 before rising back up to 7.3% in 2010. Immigration into the tiny population of Dominicans increased from 1970 to 1980 as the share of recently arrived immigrants climbed from 7.7% to 14.4%. It then dropped back to 10.7% in 1990, revived modestly to 12.2% in 2000 before dropping to 8.1% in 2010. Between 2010 and 2020, the percentage of recent migrants among Dominicans rebounded slightly to 9%, a mild version of a broader rebound across all origin groups.

Among Other Hispanics, for example, the share of recent arrivals jumped from 0.9% to 17.6% between 2010 and 2020. The percentage of new arrivals among South Americans likewise shot upward from 8,4% to 18.9%, and that for Cubans climbed from 7.3% to 15.4%. The increase was more modest for Mexicans, with the share rising from 3.6% to 7.4%, reflecting a decline in the volume of undocumented migration, as border apprehensions of Mexicans fell from 397,000 in 2010 to a record low of 128,000 in 2017 before rebounding to 253,000 in 2020. The increase was also muted among Central Americans, though at a higher level, with the share arriving since 2015 going from 8.0% to 12.1%. Over the decade, border apprehensions of Central Americans increased from 51,000 to 253,000 between 2010 and 2014, fell to 145,000 in 2015 and then surged to a record 685,000 in 2019 before dropping to 148,000 with the eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

The effect of the foregoing increases and decreases in immigration on the share of foreign born in the various Latino origins is shown in Figure 11. In the West, Mexicans were a large and well-established population in 1970, one dominated by second and third generation immigrants, so the effect of immigration was gradual, steadily increasing the percent foreign born from 17.4% in 1970 to peak at 41.4% in 2000, followed by slow decline to 29.8% in 2020. In Figure 10 we saw that Cuban arrivals began low and fell to very low levels throughout the five decades from 1970 to 2020. Thus, the monotonic decline in the share of foreign born among Cubans is hardly surprising. The percentage of foreign-born Cubans born dropped decade by decade from 74.3% in 1970 to 35.1% in 2020. The trend among Other Hispanics was uneven, but the percent foreign born remained small throughout the period, dropping from 29.3% to 8.8% in 2010 before ending in 2020 at 14.9%.

FIGURE 11 ABOUT HERE

Central Americans, South Americans, and Dominicans began the period as small populations with short histories of immigration into the West in 1970 that received a sudden influx of immigrants in the late 1970s, pushing the percent foreign born up to 99% in 1980. Immigration from the Dominican Republic was not sustained, however, and the percentage plummeted to 61% in 1990, dipped to 59.7% in 2000 before dropping more rapidly to end at just 27.2% in 2000. The decline in the share born abroad was slower and less dramatic for Central and South Americans. The former dropped from 99.1% to 78.1% between 1980 and 1990, then slid to 72.2% in 2000 and 59.7% in 2010 before finishing up at 52.0% in 2020. South Americans followed a very similar trend, falling to 72.2% in 1990, 67.1% in 2000, 58.5% in 2010 and reaching 49.3% in 2020.

The generational composition of the West's Latino population is depicted in the bar graphs presented in Figure 12. The bars show clearly how mass immigration over five decades transformed the population from one in 1970 dominated by second, third, and higher generation immigrants, to one in 2020 dominated by youthful first-generation immigrants and their young offspring. Whereas in 1970 69% of Latinos were either in the 2nd or 3+ generation (including 2.5 generation immigrants with one native-born parent), by the year 2020 70.1% were in the first, second, or 2.5 generations. The largest generational block in 1970 was the 3+ generation at 38.5% of all Latinos, but by 2020 the largest generational block was the first generation at 36.7% of Latinos. The transition plays out gradually in the bars shown in-between these two dates.

Unfortunately, the question on parental birthplace was cut from the census in 1980 and the question was not added to the Current Population Survey until 1994, so we miss the transition from 1970 to 1980 and only pick up the story in 1994.

FIGURE 12 ABOUT HERE

Despite the steady decline in the share of recent immigrants, the drop in the percent foreign born, and the shift in generational dominance just described, Figure 13 shows that the shift away from the use of Spanish in the household happened much more slowly, especially among Central Americans, South Americans, and Mexicans. With the exception of Puerto Ricans and Other Latinos, the percentage speaking Spanish at home shot upwards between 1970 and 1980 with the arrival of new immigrants. In contrast, the share among Puerto Ricans fell steadily from 63.9% in 1970 to just 27.3% in 2020. Although the share of Other Latinos speaking Spanish in the household rose from 33.6% in 1970 to 54.6% in 2000, thereafter it dropped to 34.5% in 2010 and 33.4% in 2020.

FIGURE 13 ABOUT HERE

Among other groups, the percentage speaking Spanish at home in 1970 ranged narrowly from 37.4% to 40.4% whereas ten years later the range went from 67.9% to 94.1%. The increase in Spanish speaking was least among Mexicans given that the 1970 population was dominated by later generation descendants of immigrants who arrived in the 1920s. But having reached the level of two-thirds speaking Spanish at home in 1980, the share remained unchanged for the next three decades, and only declined from 66.1% to 63.1% between 2010 and 2020. The persistence of Spanish was also notable for Central Americans, 94% of whom spoke Spanish in the home in 1980. The percentage dropped to around 85% in 1990 and remained there through 2000 before dropping to 81% in 2010 and finishing at nearly 77% in 2020.

The shift away from Spanish was more pronounced among South Americans. Although 91% spoke Spanish at home in 1980, the share dropped steadily over the ensuing decades and in 2020 reached 63%. The decline in Spanish speaking was even more marked among Cubans and Dominicans. Among the latter, the share speaking Spanish in the home fell from 91% to 68% between 1980 and 1990. After rebounding to 77% in 2000, the decline resumed and accelerated until in 2020 only 42% of Dominicans reported Spanish being spoken in their household. The shift away from Spanish was almost linear for Cubans, with the share falling from 82.7% to 50.8% between 1980 and 2020, a steady decline averaging 0.64 points per year.

Figure 14 reveals a diversity of trends in the percentage of U.S. citizens in the various Latino origin groups. Among Cubans the share of U.S. citizens steadily rose over 50 years, going from 33.6% to 82.9% between 1970 and 2000, before decelerating to reach a value of 89.5% in 2020. Other Latinos, for their part, evinced high levels of U.S. citizenship throughout the period, starting at around 78% in 1970, rising to above 90% in 1980 and 1990, dropping back to 84% in 2000, and going back to values of 96% and 93% in 2010 and 2020.

FIGURE 14 ABOUT HERE

However, Dominicans, Central Americans, and South Americans experienced sharp drops in the share of citizens between 1970 and 1980 coincident with the surge of new immigrant arrivals. The rate of citizenship among Dominicans dropped from 71.8% to 37.8% between the two census years. Among Central Americans the drop was from 53.7% to 19.4%, and among South Americans the decline went from 47.1% to 29.9%. The decrease in U.S. citizenship for Mexicans was less sharp and more gradual given the larger share of native-born citizens it contained at the outset of the period. The share of citizens fell from 85.6% in 1970 to 75.9% in 1980, 69.5% in 1990, and bottomed out at 68.4% in 2000.

After reaching their nadirs in various years, citizenship levels thereafter rose steadily across all four of the groups just discussed. From its low point of 68.4% in 2000, the Mexican citizenship rate climbed to 75.7% in 2010 and reached 83.4% in 2020, almost equaling the 85.6% observed in 1970. The post-nadir increases were even more impressive for Central Americans, South Americans, and Dominicans. Over the 40 years from 1980 to 2020 the share of U.S. citizens rose from 19.4% to 71.6% among Central Americans, from 29.9% to 82.1% among South Americans, and from 37.8% to 93.0% among Dominicans, essentially tying Other Latinos for the highest rate of U.S. citizenship. Puerto Ricans, of course, native U.S. citizens whether they are born on the island or the mainland.

Rates of Voter Registration and Voting

Turning to the topic of political participation, we first consider the share of U.S. citizens who registered to vote in the United States using data from the Current Population Surveys fielded during presidential election years beginning in 1996. These data are plotted by year in Figure 15. With the exception of Cubans, all the groups display relatively low registration rates from 1996 through 2012. Cubans begin with a 60.0% rate in 1996, which rises to 77.8% in 2000, falls to 43.4% in 2004, rises again to 53.7% in 2008 and falls again to 46.2% before rising steady to reach 78.6% in 2020.

FIGURE 15 ABOUT HERE

Although Puerto Ricans begin with a rate of 52.4% in 1996, the rate falls below the 50% level in 2000 where it remains through 2012. The other origin groups similarly languish below 50% from 1996 through 2012, with Mexicans generally evincing he lowest rates and Dominicans the highest. In 2012, registration stood at 28.1% for Mexicans, 20.3% for Puerto Ricans, 40.7% for Central and South Americans, and 46.2% for Dominicans. Like the Cubans, these groups also surged to high registration rates in 2020, with Mexicans reaching 69.5%, Central/South Americans and Dominicans rising to 76.2%, and Puerto Ricans climbing to 81.8%.

Figure 16 continues the analysis by showing trends in the rate of voting among those who are registered. All groups display a similar pattern, with rates rising between 1996 and 2000 that remained high through 2008, bit falling thereafter. The range of voting rates is narrowest in 2012 (going from 84.2% to 89.8%) and greatest in 1996 (from 63.6% to 89.8) but it is also relatively wide in 2020 (62.2% to 78.6%). Puerto Ricans displayed the lowest rate and Central/South Americans the highest rate in 1996 whereas in 2020 Mexican evinced the lowest rate while Cubans had the highest. Multiplying the fraction registered by the fraction voting yields the

effective voting rate for the population. Between 1996 and 2020, this effective rate rose from 30.9% to 53.9% indicting the rising political participation and power of Latinos in the Western states.

FIGURE 16 ABOUT HERE

Educational Attainment

Human capital in the form of education is a critical resource for workers in a post-industrial economy and the returns to education have steadily risen since the 1970s. Figure 17 shows trends Latino educational attainment in the West region from 1970 to 2020. As can be seen, the share of Latinos aged 25 and older with less than a high school education has steadily fallen, dropping from 63.7% in 1970 to 50.8% in 2000. Thereafter the decline accelerates, bringing the share down to 29.9% by 2020. In contrast, the share holding a high school degree remained fairly stable from 1970 to 2000, varying narrowly between 21% and 23%, before climbing to 26.7% in 2020.

FIGURE 17 ABOUT HERE

The share with some college grew fairly rapidly from 1970 to 1990, rising from 9.8% to 19.3% before stalling during the 1990s and then rising once again, climbing from 20.0% in 2000 to 26.1% in 2020. The share of college graduates rose quite slowly from 1970 to 2000, climbing only from 4.8% to 8.1% over three decades. Thereafter, the pace accelerated, with the share of college graduates reaching 11.9% in 2010 and 17.3% in 2020. As Figure 18 shows, however, there has always been considerable variation in college attainment between groups, and this heterogeneity only increased over time.

FIGURE 18 ABOUT HERE

Throughout the period from 1970 to 2020, Mexicans lay at the bottom of the educational distribution. The share of college graduates remained in the single digits from 1970 through 2010 as the percentage of college graduates rose slowly from 3.6% to 9.9% over 40 years. Also near the bottom of the distribution were Central Americans. With the surge of immigrants during the 1970s and 1980s the share of college graduates actually fell, going from 10.2% in 1970 to 5.3% in 1990 before rising to 8.6% in 2000, 11.5% in 2010, and finally reaching 16.4% in 2020, roughly two points above the Mexican percentage.

Puerto Ricans and Other Latinos also began with single digit rates of college completion in 1970 (5.7% and 8.0%, respectively). The share of college graduates rose modestly for both groups over the next two decades, with the two groups achieving respective percentages of 11.2% and 12.6% in 1990. Thereafter the growth curve accelerated for Puerto Ricans, rising linearly over the next three decades to a college completion rate of 30.4% in 2020. After a dip in 2000, the share of college graduates also rose sharply for Other Latinos, achieving a figure of 25.5% in 2020.

As with Central Americans, the share of college graduates among Dominicans fell from 1970 to 1980 with the surge in new immigrant arrivals, dropping from 26.7% to 13.0%. However, Dominicans recovered more quickly with the rate of increase in college attainment accelerating after 1990 and again after 2000. Despite a slowdown in the rate of change after 2010, Dominicans finished in 2020 with a completion rate of 35.4%, overtaking Cubans to achieve the second-highest rate in the figure. The share of college graduates likewise rose steadily across the five decades for both Cubans and South Americans, with the latter claiming the top position from 1980 onward. Between 1970 and 2020 the percentage of South Americans holding a college degree rose from 18.2% to 43.0%. Over the same period the share among Cubans rose from 12.4% to 32.9%.

Labor Force Participation and Occupational Status

Figures 19 and 20 show employment and unemployment rates for Latinos and Latinas from 1970 through 2020. Males generally displayed high employment rates, though they fell slightly from 85.4% in 1970 to 81.4% in 1990 and then dropped more sharply from 1990 to 2000, going from 81.4% to 71.2%. Over the same period, the share outside the labor force rose from 11.8% to 23.4%. Thereafter the employment rate recovered somewhat to attain a value of roughly 75% in both 2010 and 2020, achieved by a decline in the share outside the labor force between 2000 and 2010 and a drop in unemployment rates between 2010 and 2020.

FIGURES 19 AND 20 ABOUT HERE

Among women, we observe a rising rate of employment from 1970 to 1990 as well as from 2000 to 2020, with a slight decline during the 1990s when the female employment rate dipped from 56.7% to 52.9% owing to an uptick in the share of women outside the labor force. During the two decades before the nineties, the female employment rate rose from rose by 18.5 points and during the two decades afterward it rose by 11.4% to peak at 64.3% in 2020, exactly 11 points below the male rate. Very clearly, female workers have come to play an important role in the economic sustenance of the Latino community in the West.

Among males, variation in rates of unemployment is limited and the range has narrowed over time, as shown for males in Figure 21. In 2007, unemployment rates ranged from 3.2% to 6.4% with Puerto Ricans on top and Other Latinos at the bottom. After widening in 1980 the range by 2000 had narrowed to range from 4.2% to 5.8%. In the aftermath of the great recession unemployment rates in 2010 had both risen and widened, from 7.8% to 11.1%. With the economic recovery, however, by 2020 unemployment rates had returned to narrow range from 4.5% to 5.9%, once again with Puerto Ricans at the top and Other Latinos at the bottom. The sample sizes for Dominicans are too small to yield reliable estimates of unemployment rates, either for men or for women.

FIGURE 21 ABOUT HERE

As shown in Figure 22, trends over time were quite similar for Latinas, except for a surge in unemployment in 1990 that was particularly felt by Mexicans and Central American women, whose rates peaked at 6.5% and 7.7%, respectively, compared rates ranging from 3.6% to 4.8%

across the other groups. These rates dropped to around 5.5% in 2000, with the rates for Puerto Ricans and Other Latinas rising to join them at this mark, far greater than the 2.5% and 3.1% for observed for Cuban and South American women in 2000. Although unemployment increased across all groups during the Great Recession, the rates clustered at two different levels. At the high end were Central Americans, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Other Latinas whose rates ranged from 8.2% to 9.3%. At the low end once again were South Americans and Cubans with respective rates of 7.1 and 6.8. As with the men, unemployment rates fell sharply between 2010 and 2020 and the range of rates narrowed, going from 3.7% for Other Latinas up to 5.4% for Cubans, who had also occupied the lowest and highest positions in 1970.

FIGURE 22 ABOUT HERE

To complete our analysis of labor force trends, we make use of the Hauser-Warren SEI occupational status scores (see Hauser and Warren 1997). These scores are constructed from schooling levels and earnings associated with different occupational categories. Professional, managerial, and skilled technical occupations generally yield SEI scores in the 60s and 70s, whereas crafts occupations and skilled manual job categories typically score in the 40s and 50s and sales and clerical occupations fall in the 30s. The bottom of the occupational status hierarchy is composed of unskilled service and manual laborers with scores typically in the 10s and 20s.

Average SEI scores for Latinos in the West from 1970 to 2020 are presented in Figure 23. As with educational attainment, Mexicans and Central Americans fall at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. Across the five decades, the score for Mexicans rises slowly but at a fairly even pace, going from 26.6 in 1970 to 31.2. Central Americans experience a decline in average occupational status with the arrival of new immigrants between 1970 and 1980, with the average SEI dropping three 3 points from 28.6 to 25.6. After languishing between 1980 and 1990, occupational status begins to rise and from 1990 to 2020 almost catches up with Mexicans. Their average SEI Score of 30.6 is at the bottom of the status distribution, though it is above the initial score of 28.6 in 1970 and five points above the score observed in 1980.

FIGURE 23 ABOUT HERE

The remaining groups have status scores ranging from 28.2 to 33.0 in 1970. Occupational status changed little for South Americans, Dominicans, and Other Latinos between 1970 and 1980, but beginning in 1970 the scores for Cubans and Puerto Ricans immediately begin to move upward at a steady pace that persists across the decades. From 1970 to 2020 the average SEI score rose from 28.2 to 36,7 for Puerto Ricans and from 29.0 to 38.0 for Cubans. Dominicans and South Americans join the upward trend after 1980 and also end up achieving average status scores of around 38. Other Latinos lag until 2000 before beginning a rapid rise up to a score of 36.1. As of 2020, these five groups are clustered tightly together in the range from 36.1 to 38.1, well above the Mexicans and Central Americans clustered just above and below 31.0.

Income and Poverty

Figure 24 summarizes trends in mean and median household incomes Latinos in the West region from 1970 to 2020. As always, median incomes are lower than mean incomes because

high earning households pull the mean upward compared to the median, which is at the midpoint of the distribution and therefore less sensitive to outliers. As a result, the trend in median income is relatively flat, varying narrowly between $46,000 and $50,000 from 1970 to 2010 before jumping upward to $64,000 in 2020. In contrast, the mean income rose from $53,000 in 1980 to $64,000 in 2000, where it remained in 2010 until jumping to $83,000 in 2020, producing a wider gap between mean and median incomes.

FIGURE 24 ABOUT HERE

As with other indicators, we observe substantial variation in household income between the origin groups, but in this case with little convergence over time. As shown in Figure 25, Mexican average household income languishes between $46,000 and $50,000 from 1970 to 2010 before suddenly rising to around $63,000 in 2020. Paralleling the trend in occupational status, median household income declines for Central Americans from 1970 to 1980, dropping $58,000 1970 to $37,000, a 36% drop in just a decade. After 1980, however, income rebounds and moves steadily upward across the decades, giving Central Americans a median household income of $61,0000 in 2020, just below that of Mexicans.

FIGURE 25 ABOUT HERE

Unlike trends in occupational status, we also observe a drop in the incomes of Dominicans, Other Latinos, South Americans, and Puerto Ricans between 1970 and 1980. For Dominicans the drop is substantial, going from $74,000 to $46,000 (a 38% decline). It is also relatively large for Other Latinos (from $63,000 to $50,000, a 21% drop), South Americans (from $62,000 to $54,000, a 13% drop), and Puerto Ricans (from $52,000 to $46,000, a 15% drop). Only Cubans escape the 1970s decline in household income, maintaining a stable average between $56,000 and $58,000 from 1970 to 2000. Among the other groups, household incomes begin to rise at different times and follow different trajectories, but all end up surpassing their 1970 averages by 2020. At this point in time, Dominicans display the highest average income at around $83,000, followed by South Americans at $57,000, Puerto Ricans at $71,000, with Cubans and Other Latinos both around $68,000 and Mexicans and Central Americans at just $61,000 to $63,000 per year.

The foregoing diverse trends in employment, occupational attainment, and income yield a wide variety of trends in the poverty rate, as seen in Figure 26. Other Latinos, Central Americans, Puerto Ricans, and South Americans experienced rising rates of poverty after 1970 that eventually peaked and move downward. For example, the poverty rate for Other Latinos rose sharply between 1970 and 1980 then more slowly between 1980 and 2000, when the poverty rate peaked at 29.3% before falling to 16.7% in 2020, well above the 9.4% where it began in 1970. The Central American poverty rate likewise rose sharply from 1970 to 1980, going from 13.6% to 21.9% and then edging up to 23.5% in 1990, the highest rate observed in the figure. Thereafter Central Americans experienced a sustained drop in poverty to a rate of 15.8% in 2020, but more than two points above where it began five decades earlier.

FIGURE 26 ABOUT HERE

The increase in the Puerto Rican poverty rate from 1970 to 1980 was quite modest, going only from 16.4% to 17.9% and then the rate immediately began moving downward, stalling out briefly during the early 2000s, but eventually plummeting to 11.4%, well below where it began in 1970. The rise in South American poverty was even smaller, going up just one point from 12.7 to 13.7 from 1970 to 1980. Thereafter it declined to 11.3% in 1990 but rose back up to 13.0% in 2000 before falling to 9.7% in 2020, again below its 1970 value.

Unlike the other groups, Mexicans and Cubans unexpectedly experienced a *decline* in the poverty rate between 1970 and 1980, which fell from 21.6% to 19.9% in the Mexican case and from 13.6% to 10.5% for Cubans. Thereafter, both curves ruse up to a plateau from 1990 to 2010. For Mexicans the plateau is high at around 23% and for Cubans it is much lower at around 12% or 13%. In the final decade, unexpectedly, the two groups move in opposite directions. The Mexican rate plummets to 15%, its lowest level in 50 years. In contrast, the Cuban rate rises to 15.5%, its highest rate in 50 years. As with the unemployment rates, sample sizes were too small to estimate reliable rates for Dominicans.
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Home Ownership and Potential Wealth

The final economic indicator we consider is home ownership, the most important source of wealth for most American families. Figure 27 plots rates of home ownership for the different origin groups from 1970 to 2020. The lowest rate in most years is that of Central Americans, with home ownership dropping from 43.6% in 1970 to 27.4% in 1980 and rising to just 28.3% in 1990, Thereafter the rate climbs rapidly during the 1990s and then decelerates over the next two decades to finally end at 44.7% in 2020, about one point above where it was in 1970, but 10 points below the next lowest group. Puerto Ricans also display an initial decline in home ownership, which moved modestly downward from 47.7% in 1970 to 41.1% in 1990. As with the Central Americans, the rate then rises steadily but at a decelerating pace to reach 54% for a slight gain in ownership across the five decades.

FIGURE 27 ABOUT HERE

Mexicans evince a similar trajectory. Home ownership declines from 54.9% in 1970 to 45.4% in 1990 before reversing course and heading upward over the next three decades to end at 53.7% in 2020, about a point below where the rate originally stood in 1970. The slide in ownership lasted for three decades for Other Latinos. Beginning with by far the highest rate of home ownership of 68% in 1970, the rate steadily fell to just 54.7% in 2000 before rebounding to 64.3% only to drop back to 59.8% in 2020, eight points below where it began back in 1970, but nonetheless the highest rate observed for any group in 2020.

The decline in home ownership came later for Dominicans. After rising from 43.6% to 50.7% between 1970 and 1990, the rate plummeted to 32% in 2000. Just as abruptly, the trend reversed over the next two decades and by 2020 56.5% of Dominicans were living in an owned home, their highest rate ever. Only two groups escaped any decline in ownership over the period. The rate for Cubans consistently rose from 1970 to 2010, going from 27.9% to 56.6% before falling back slightly to 54.0% in 2020. South Americans began in 1970 with a home ownership rate of 47.6%, which like that of Cubans rose steadily to peak at a high level of 60.1% in 2010

before declining to 58.2% in 2020, the second highest rate. All told, over the five decades, home ownership declined for two groups (Mexicans and Other Hispanics), increased for four groups (Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Dominicans, and South Americans), and remained unchanged for one group (Central Americans).

Wealth for most families is built from combination of ownership and home value, of course, and the past five decades have generally been a time of rising home values in the West Region, especially along the Pacific Coast and particularly in California where he majority of Latinos in the region reside. Figure 28 plots mean and median values for homes owned by Latinos over the five decades. Except for the 1990s, prices rose across the entire period. From 1970 to 1980 median and mean home values rose in parallel, with the former rising from an average of $99,000 to one of $180,000 and the latter from $112,000 to $183,000. Thereafter the gap between median and mean rose from 1980 to 1990, narrowed a bit during the sluggish market of the 1990s, but hen widened again thereafter, indicating growing inequality in housing prices. Home values took off after 2000 and accelerated after 2010, ending with a median value of $332,000 in 2020 compared $99,000 in 1970. The mean home value of $413,000 in 2020 was 3.7 times the $112,000 observed five decades earlier.

FIGURE 28 ABOUT HERE

As one might expect, we observe wide variation in the home values garnered by different groups over the period. As shown in Figure 29, Mexicans began with the lowest median home value in 1970 ($99,000) and 50 years later in 2020 they still had the lowest home value ($339,000), albeit at a greatly inflated price and only marginally below Other Latinos with an average home value of $344,000. In 1990 the intergroup variation in home values markedly increased. Cubans experienced a huge run-up in home value, rocketing up from just $137,000 in 1970 (in the middle of the pack) to $408,000 in 1990. The run-up was also impressive, if not quite as spectacular for South Americans and Dominicans (whose average home values both rose to around $340,000) as well as for Central Americans and Puerto Ricans (whose homes both inflated around $295,000).

FIGURE 29 ABOUT HERE

The market correction of the 1990s brought these astronomical prices down and greatly narrowed the range of home values, but after 2000 the escalation of prices resumed, and all groups pulled away from Mexicans and Other Latinos who remained at the bottom of the market. At the top in 2020 were South Americans and Cubans with homes averaging around $458,000 in value, followed by Central Americans at $440,000 in value, Puerto Ricans at $408,000 in value, and Dominicans at $390,000 in value. Potential home wealth is determined by the product of the average home ownership rate and the average home value, and the resulting quantities are shown in Figure 30. South Americans lead the pack with a potential home wealth of $267,000, followed by Cubans at $248,00, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans both at around $220,000, Other Latinos at $205,000, Central Americans at $197,000, and Mexicans last at $182,000. Whatever the indicator of socioeconomic status, Mexicans and Central Americans seemingly always end up at the bottom of the distribution.

FIGURE 30 ABOUT HERE

THE RISE OF METROPOLITAN LATINO COMMUNITIES

In this section, we examine the presence and status of Latinos in the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) located throughout the West, focusing on those that contain a significant Latino presence (a Latino population of 30,000 or more). Figure 31 begins by showing the size of the 23 metropolitan Latino populations in California that met this criterion in 2020. They range in size from Los Angeles (just over 6 million Latino residents) to the appropriately named Chico (with just some 35,000 residents—*chico* means little or small in Spanish). After Los Angeles, the next largest Latino community is in Riverside (with 2.4 million Latinos) followed by San Diego and San Francisco (both just over 1 million). Two other MSA contain more than half a million Latino residents: Fresno (526,000) and Sacramento (525,000). Bakersfield and San Jose are just below this threshold (with respective Latino Populations of 499,000 and 478,000). Another ten metro areas have at least 100,000 residents.

FIGURE 31 ABOUT HERE

To a large extent, the distribution of Latinos across the cities of California reflects the heavy involvement of Mexicans in the state's agriculture industry. According to the 2020 ACS, of all those employed in California's agricultural sector 62.8% were Mexican (and another 5.5% were Central American). The concentration of Mexicans in agriculture helps to explain the distribution of Latinos in farm communities such as Napa, Madera, Santa Rosa, El Centro, Merced, Salinas, Modesto, Visalia, Stockton, and Oxnard, and even in larger cities in the Central Valley such as Bakersfield, Sacramento, and Fresno.

Figure 32 shows the size of Latino communities in other MSAs throughout the West. Across the 25 the areas shown, the number of Latinos ranges from 1.6 million in Phoenix to 35,000 in Prescott, AZ, located a bit to its north. After Phoenix come Las Vegas and Denver, both with around 750,000 Latino residents, and then Seattle, Albuquerque, and Tucson with respective populations of 454,000, 430,000 and 397,000, In addition to Seattle, Latinos are now found in a variety of cities outside of traditional locations in the southwest, including Portland, Yakima, Boise, Honolulu, Eugene, Spokane, Wenatchee, and Anchorage, again reflecting the concentration of Mexicans in agriculture. Yakima and Wenatchee are farm centers in Washington State and Eugene is a center for Oregon's wine industry, in addition to being a university town.

FIGURE 32 ABOUT HERE

Figure 33 shifts from the absolute to the relative size of Latino populations in California's metropolitan areas. The left-hand side of the figure with the highest Latino percentages once again illustrates the importance of agriculture. El Centro, as the name implies, lies at the center of the agriculturally important Imperial Valley. Fresno, Bakersfield, Stockton, Modesto, Visalia, Hanford, Madera, and Merced are all located within expansive agrarian region known as the San Juaquin Valley. Salinas is located at the head of the Salinas valley. Oxnard lies in a rich coastal plain noted for its fruits and vegetables just north of Los Angeles; and Napa, Santa Rosa, and Santa Maria are vinicultural centers. Of the aforementioned areas, nine are majority Latino, and

among them the average share is 51.9%, underscoring the centrality of Mexican labor to California's rich agricultural economy.

FIGURE 33 ABOUT HERE

Figure 34 continues the analysis by examining the percentage Latino in other metropolitan areas of the West. In his display, majority Latino areas are much less common. Out of the 25 MSAs, there are only four: Las Cruces, NM (69%), which is near El Paso and not far from the Mexican border; Yuma, AZ (59.7%) on the joint border with Mexico and California; Santa Fe, NM (53.2%), which since 1619 has been the capital of New Mexico; and Yakima, WA (53.1%), a farm town known for its wineries and orchards. Albuquerque, NM comes close to the 50% threshold at 48.0%, as does Pueblo, CO at 46.1%. After that, the percentage falls of steeply. The only other metropolitan area outside the southwest with a notable share of Latinos is Wenatchee, WA (30,7%), which calls itself the "Apple Capital of the World" (Rader 2007).

FIGURE 34 ABOUT HERE

Figure 35 moves beyond the simple number and percentage of Latinos to consider their national and regional origins in California's 23 MSAs. The bar charts further underscore both the demographic weight of Mexicans in California and their key role it plays in the state's farm economy. In the farm communities of El Centro, Fresno, Hanford, Madera, Modesto, and Visalia, for example, the Latino populations are all at least 90% Mexican. The lowest percentage Mexican (62.0%) is in San Francisco, which also displays significant shares of Central Americans (18.0%), Other Latinos (9.2%), and South Americans (6.3%).

FIGURE 35 ABOUT HERE

The next lowest share of Mexicans occurs in Los Angeles (74.2%), which likewise has a sizeable Central American community (15.6%). With the exception of small percentages of Puerto Ricans in some metro areas (0.1% to 3.9%) Latinos from the Caribbean are not much in evidence in any metro area. In general, the category of Other Hispanics seems to be the most prevalent after Central Americas, and their share of the population is highest in Yuba City (17.4%), followed Santa Rosa 12.5%, Vallejo (11.5%), Santa Cruz (10.2%), Sacramento and San Luis Obispo (at 10.0% each), Chico (9.6%), San Francisco (9.2%), and Napa (8.9%).

Figure 36 repeats the foregoing analysis for Western MSAs outside of California. Although Mexicans still dominate among Latinos in these metropolitan populations, we observe far more ethnic diversity outside of that state than within it. Indeed, in three cases Mexicans constitute a minority of Latinos. In Anchorage, they make up 48.6% of the population, with Other Latinos constituting 24.7%, Puerto Ricans 14.9%, Dominicans 6.4. As already noted, in Honolulu, Puerto Ricans constitute the largest share of the Latino population at 36.8. They are followed by Mexicans at 27.5%, and Other Hispanics at 26.8%.

FIGURE 36 ABOUT HERE

In Santa Fe, Other Latinos outnumber Mexicans outright, 49.8% to 46.2%. These "others" are likely people who identify as Hispanos and not Mexicans, being the descendants of Spanish settlers who arrived in the 16th and 17th centuries. This population is also evident in Albuquerque where Other Hispanics constitute 36.7% of the Latino population, but less so in Las Cruces, NM, which is geographically and culturally closer to Mexico. South Americans are unusually prevalent in Provo (20.8%) and Salt Lake City (10.7%) possibly reflecting the fruits of missionary work carried out in that continent by the members of the Church of Latter-Day Saints, commonly known as Mormons.

We now turn to an examination of patterns of Latino population growth in the West's largest metropolitan Latino communities from 1900 to 2020. Figure 37 shows Latino Population growth trajectories for Los Angeles, Riverside, Phoenix, San Diego, and San Francisco. The graph reveals that Los Angeles first began to stand out from other metro areas during the Mexican immigration boom of the 1920s (Cardoso 1980) when its Latino population rose from 56,000 in 1920 to 214,000 in 1930 (Grebler, Moore, and Guzman 1970). With the onset of the Great Depression and the advent of the mass deportation campaign directed at Mexicans from 1930 to 1934, LA's Latino population grew little during the 1930s (Hoffman 1974; Balderrama and Rodriguez 1995). Owing to the surge of in-migration for employment in defense industries during the Second World War, it rose from 227,000 to 341,000 during the 1940s. In 1950 the Latino population of Los Angeles embarked on an explosive growth trajectory that would last for the rest of the century, moderating only after the year 2000, with the curve to asymptotically drift upward toward a total of just over 6 million persons in 2020.

FIGURE 37 ABOUT HERE

Significant Latino population growth next became evident in San Francisco during the 1940s. Latino population growth emerged in Phoenix, Riverside, and San Diego in the 1950s, but in 1970 Riverside began to pull away from the others. Rapid growth persisted in that MSA growth through the 1970s and 1980s and accelerated after 2000 to reach a peak of 2.4 million in 2020. The last metro area to break away from the pack was Phoenix in 2010, jumping from 1.1 million Latinos in that year to 1.6 million in 2020, leaving San Diego and San Francisco behind with Latino populations of around a million persons each.

Figure 38 further examines trends in Latino population growth by considering how the percentage of Latinos changed in each of the foregoing MSAs from 1900 to 2020. The only area with a relatively large Latino community at first was Phoenix, with a Latino percentage of 22.4% in 1900. After rising slightly to 24.7% in 1910 it then declined to 12.4% in 1930. From 1930 to 1980 the percentage Latino in Phoenix fluctuated in the range of 12%-13%, owing to limited immigration from south of the Mexico-U.S. border and a rising tide of White Anglo-American migrants from within the United States. The share of Latinos in Phoenix began to rise after 1980 as new immigration from Mexico took hold, and the pace of change accelerated during 1990s before slowing during the 2000s and 2010s to reach 32.1% in 2020.

FIGURE 38 ABOUT HERE

Although Riverside began the 20th century with a low Latino percentage of just 6% in 1900, between 1910 and 1930 the share of Latinos shot upward to 23.8 in latter year. Over the next two decades, however, the Latino share receded and bottomed out at 13%-14% in the 1950s. Thereafter growth resumed, slowly during the 1960s and 1970s and accelerated after 1980, rising by around ten points per decade through 2010 when growth moderated, but nonetheless managed to produce a majority-Latino area (52.2%) in 2020, with a higher share of Latinos even than Los Angeles. The growth curve for LA closely approximates the absolute growth curve displayed in the prior figure. The share of Latinos rises from 4.4% to 6.1% from 1900 to 1910, increases to 9.3% in the 1920s, decreases during the years of depression, deportation, and warfare during 1930s and 1940s to reach a level of 7.7% in 1950. Thereafter the boom in Latino population growth pushes the Latino percentage steadily upward to 41.2% in 2000. Although the rate of change moderated in the 2000s and 2010s, the Latino population of Los Angeles nonetheless grew to constitute 46.0% of the MSA population in 2020.

Although San Diego began with a much lower Latino percentage than Phoenix in 1900 (just 2.7% compared to 22.4%), it then rose rapidly 9.3% in 1920. Thereafter growth declined again to reach a minimum of 5.5% in 1950. Growth resumed during the1960s three decades before Phoenix's takeoff point, surpassing its percentage growth curve during the 1980s but remaining close to it for the remainder of the period, ending in 2020 with a share of 33.1% Latino, just one point above that in Phoenix.

Although Figure 37 showed the absolute growth curves for San Francisco and San Diego remained close to one another throughout the period of observation, in relative terms San Francisco lagged behind San Diego for the entire 120 years. Beginning with the lowest percentage Latino of just 1.7% in 1900, San Francisco's percentage growth curve slowly but steadily moved upward during the first half of the 20th century to reach 5.1% at mid-century. After 1950 the pace of change increased a bit and accelerated a little more after 1990, but never reached the pace set in the other metro areas. A of 2020, the Latino share in San Francisco stood at just 21.9%, the lowest level in the chart.

The final two figures assess Latino population growth in selected metropolitan areas outside of California, beginning with Figure 39, which depicts absolute growth trajectories in ten MSAs containing the largest Latino community in each state (except for Montana and Wyoming, in which no metropolitan area has a large Latino population). In the largest of these communities (Denver, Fresno, Albuquerque, and Fresno) Latino population growth began in the 1930s, continued in the 1940s, and accelerated in the 1950s. After 1980, however, the curves began to diverge, as Tucson fell behind the others. Then in 1980, Denver and Fresno began to pull away from Albuquerque, which also fell behind.

FIGURE 39 ABOUT HERE

Although growth stalled in Albuquerque during the 1980s and 1990s, it surged from 2000 to 2010 to surpass Tucson. Growth in the Latino population then stalled again to yield a 2020 population of 430,000, well below the Latino populations of Fresno and Denver. Latino population growth in these two MSAs proceeded upward at a rapid pace from 1990 to 2010, but at the latter date growth ceased in Fresno and the Latino population dropped by around 25,000 to

reach 526,000 in 2020. Denver's rapid growth continued uninterrupted, however, to finish with a Latino population of around three quarters of a million, well ahead of Fresno.

Among the remainder of the MSAs in the figure, we see little hint of growth until the 1960s, and rapid growth really doesn't begin to take hold until 1970, and then only in Seattle, Portland, Salt Lake, and Honolulu. The latter MSA initially moved ahead in 1980 but growth did not continue after 1990 and instead turned downward to a occupy a very different trajectory beginning in 2000. In contrast, Salt Lake, Portland, and Seattle continued to follow their earlier trajectories. Although their growth paths were roughly comparable through 2010, in that year we observe another parting of the ways, as Seattle's growth accelerates, Portland continues along the same path, and Salt Lake undergoes a decline between yielding respective 2020 Latino populations of 454,000, 430,000, and 397,000.

The last MSAs to produce significant Latino communities are Boise and Anchorage, which begin to take off circa 1990. Boise accelerated most rapidly and by 2000 it had moved up to occupy the same growth trajectory as Honolulu, which earlier had fallen out of synch with Seattle, Portland, and Salt Lake. Boise and Honolulu then share the same growth path from 2000 to 2020, achieving Latino populations of 111,000 and 100,000, respectively, in 2020. In contrast, Latino population growth never really accelerates in Anchorage, and instead the curve moves slowly and steadily upward to produce a community of just 35,000 Latinos in 2020.

Figure 40 completes the analysis of Latino population growth by plotting the percent Latino by decade from 1900 to 2020. Two of the MSAs began the 20th century as majority Latino areas: Tucson with a Latino percentage of 64.3% in 1900, and Albuquerque, with a Latino percentage in that year of 51.9. After 1900 the Latino percentage in both areas dropped precipitously. The decline continued in Tucson until 1960 when the freefall was finally interrupted at a Latino share of 19.9%. The Latino percentage changes little until 1980 when it began to move upward again. Thereafter, Tucson's Latino percentage rises steadily to reach 30.7% in 2020. Albuquerque's recovery began sooner, in 1950, and proceeded with periods of modest acceleration in the 1970s and early 2000s to finally reach a Latino share of 48.0% in 2020.

<center>FIGURE 40 ABOUT HERE</center>

All the remaining MSAs shown in Figure 40 began with a Latino share under 2% in 1900. After 1920, however, Fresno started to pull rapidly away from the others and reached a Latino share of 11.5% in 1950. At that point growth further accelerated and continued apace through 1990 when the Latino share had climbed to 34.3%. At that point it accelerated once more to cross the 50% threshold in 2010 and then proceed further upward to end at 52.8% in 2020. Denver is the next to break off from the others in 1930, reaching a figure of 4.6% Latino in 1950. At that point the pace quickens and the share proceeds upward to 12.2% by 1990, after which the upward slope increased further to create a Latino percentage of 20.7% in 2020.

Growth finally picks up for the other metropolitan areas in 1970, at which point they all had Latino percentages of 2.9% or lower. Over the next five decades they moved upward at different but moderate paces to finish in 2020 with Latino percentages of 17.3% in Salt Lake,

14.1% in Boise, 12.6% in Portland, 11.3% in Seattle, 10.6% in Honolulu, and just 7.9% in Anchorage.

THE STATE OF URBAN LATINOS

Research increasingly underscores the critical role played by neighborhoods in shaping life chances in the United States (Chetty and Hendren 2018a, 2018b) and residential segregation is a powerful determinant of relative advantage and disadvantage within neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993; Quillian 2012; Massey and Rugh 2018, 2021). In this section, we therefore consider trends and patterns of Latino segregation and spatial isolation in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) of the West Census Region.

Latino Segregation and Spatial Isolation

Figure 41 begins the analysis by examining the degree of residential segregation between Latinos and non-Hispanic Whites (hence forth just Whites) in the region's five largest Latino metropolitan communities. The first measure of residential segregation that we consider is the index of dissimilarity, which ranges from 0 to 100 and represents the relative percentage of Latino residents who would have to exchange neighborhoods with Whites to achieve an even residential distribution (Massey and Denton 1988). In an even distribution, each neighborhood reflects the racial composition of the metropolitan population as a whole.

FIGURE 41 ABOUT HERE

Neighborhoods here are defined by census tracts, which generally contain between 4,000 and 6,000 inhabitants. A value of zero means that Latinos and White non-Latinos are evenly distributed across a metropolitan area's census tracts, and 100 indicates complete segregation where Latinos and Whites share no tract in common. Scores of 60 or greater are generally considered high, those from 30 to 60 moderate, and those below 30 low. Indices for 1970 to 2010 come from Rugh and Massey (2012) and those for 2020 are taken from Logan and Stultz (2021).

According to the foregoing criteria, as of 2020 Latinos were highly segregated in Los Angeles and moderately segregated in Phoenix, San Diego, and Riverside. In Phoenix and Riverside there was no clear trend. Latino segregation in Riverside moved slightly downward from 1970 to 1990, climbed upward between 1990 to 2000 and then remained essentially unchanged over the next three decades, leaving the index four points above where it was in 1970 but with no obvious trend in either direction. In Phoenix, the segregation index fluctuated back and forth between 47 and 52 but ended up at 47.1, just 0.4 points below its 1970 value, leaving the degree of segregation essentially unchanged over the five decades.

In contrast, Latino segregation clearly increased in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego. In Los Angeles the segregation score rose steadily upward over the decades to a peak of 63.4 in 2010 and then moved slightly downward to 61.0 in 2020—still 17.5 points above its 1970 level. San Francisco and San Diego both moved from the middle segment of the moderate range in 1970 into the upper segment of that range in 2000. Thereafter Latino segregation declined in both MSAs and moved back into the middle portion of the range, yielding respective scores of

46.1 and 47.1 in 2020. Despite the slight drop in both metro areas after 2000, Latino-White segregation in 2020 was nonetheless ten points higher than it had been in 1970.

Figure 42 examines trends in segregation for selected other MSAs in the West (chosen by the availability of data for 2020 from Logan and Stults). These data reveal a varied pattern of change over time. In Tucson and Albuquerque, Latino-White segregation moved steadily downward across the five decades. In Tucson, the segregation index declined by a total of more than ten points from 1970 to 2020, dropping from 53.1 to 42.5 over the period. Likewise, in Albuquerque Latino segregation fell by more than 14 points, going from 46.5 to 32.1. In Salt Lake, Seattle, and Portland, however, Latino segregation initially dropped before going back up and then declining once again. The initial drop between 1970 and 1980 was quite substantial in Seattle and Portland: 10.1 points in the former (from 32.8 to 22.7) and 11.5 points in Portland (from 31.8 to 20.3).

FIGURE 42 ABOUT HERE

In Seattle, however, the decline slowed to a glacial pace from 1980 to 1990, whereas in Portland it was immediately reversed and by 2010 both segregation scores were above their 1970 values. Although declines in segregation between 2010 and 2020 in yielded a small net decline in segregation in both MSAs over 50 years, with a shared index value of 30.0 segregation levels had changed very little, leaving Latinos at the boundary between low and moderate segregation. In Denver, segregation fluctuated between 1970 and 2010 but finished with a decline that reduced the Latino-White segregation to a score of 44.6, right in the middle of the moderate range and 2.6 points below its 1970 value.

Whereas the dissimilarity index conceptualizes segregation as a departure from an ideal of evenness, a second index seeks to capture the experience of segregation within the neighborhoods that Latinos actually inhabit. Known as the isolation index, it equals the percentage Latino in the neighborhood of the average Latino (Massey and Denton 1988). It varies from a low point equal to the share of Latinos in the metropolitan area to a high of 100, with the latter figure meaning that the average Latino lives in a neighborhood that is 100% Latino. Whereas the dissimilarity index depends strictly on the evenness of the residential distribution, the isolation depends on both evenness and the relative share of Latinos in the metro area.

Figure 43 shows trends in the spatial isolation of Latinos in the five largest metropolitan Latino communities of the West. Given that the Latino percentage was on the increase across all these areas, we would expect to encounter a rising level of spatial isolation for Latinos over the decades, and this is what we observe, especially during the period from 1970 to 2000. In four of the five areas, the trend flattened or declined slightly thereafter, whereas in in Riverside it kept moving upward. Over the five decades, the neighborhood isolation index increased from 19.5 to 32.0 in San Francisco, from 21.0 to 48.1 in San Diego, and from 32.1 to 45.9 in Phoenix. In Riverside, however, the index rose from 30.5 to 60.1; and in Los Angeles it went from 37.8 to 63.9, leaving both MSAs with a high degree of Latino spatial isolation.

FIGURE 43 ABOUT HERE

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In Figure 44 we look at isolation trends in other Western metropolitan areas. In Seattle, Portland, and Salt Lake, trends generally reflect the newness of Latino immigration and the relatively modest percentages of Latino that had accumulated in these areas through 2020. Isolation levels were very low and relatively unchanging from 1970 to 1990 before Latino immigration to these MSAs took off. As the Latino populations grew after 1990, however, neighborhood isolation levels steadily rose. In Seattle the Latino isolation index went from 3.4 to 14.9 between 2000 and 2020; in Portland it rose from 6.0 to 18.9; and in Salt Lake it climbed from 10.3 to 28.9. Despite these increases, the 2020 index values in these MSAs nonetheless represent very modest levels of spatial isolation that would not greatly concern most segregation researchers.

FIGURE 45 ABOUT HERE

The trend in Denver's solation levels was rather flat before 1990, we observe a nine-point increase between 1990 and 2010, followed by a modest decline to leave the isolation index at 37.4 in 2020. Although greater than the index value of 28.4 in 1970, the 2020 value still constitutes a relatively moderate level of spatial isolation. In Albuquerque and Tucson, isolation levels fell from relatively high levels in 1970 to lower levels in 1990. As in the other metro areas, however, Latino isolation rose after 1990 to peak in 2010 and then decline slightly to 55.6% in Albuquerque and 49.9% in Tucson, both slightly higher than the isolation levels observed five decades earlier. The most dramatic increase in Latino spatial isolation occurred in Fresno, where the index rose continuously across the decades, moving from an index value of 37.6 in 1970 to 62.7% in 2020. In the latter year, therefore, the average Latino resident of Albuquerque and Fresno both lived in majority Latino neighborhoods, and Tucson was not far behind with an isolation index of 49.9.

Spatial Concentrations of Latino Poverty and Affluence

Among the most important consequences of residential segregation is its ability to spatially concentrate circumstances associated with the segregated group. When a racially segregated group is poor, for example the relegation of its members to subset of racially homogenous neighborhoods necessarily concentrates poverty spatially to create a disadvantaged social order marked by a scarcity of social and financial capital and elevated levels of social disorder and violence, the combined effect of which works to undermine socioeconomic attainment (Massey and Denton 1993; Sampson 2012; Sharkey 2013). Conversely, when a group is affluent segregation concentrates high-income people spatially to create a social order rich in resources with few external threats to physical or mental wellbeing (Massey and Tannen 2016; Massey and Rugh 2021).

Figure 45 presents trends in the spatial concentration of poverty within census tracts occupied by Latinos in the West's largest metropolitan communities from 1970 through 2010 (detailed data on income and poverty in 2020 are not yet available for small geographic units). The graph shows P* isolation indices computed to measure the percentage poor in the neighborhood of the average poor Latino. Values above 20.0 are generally taken to indicate a high concentration of poverty, and those above 40.0 signal an extreme concentration of

deprivation. Poverty is indicated by a family income below the federal poverty line for a family of four. As can be seen, in all five metro areas Latinos experienced a drop in the concentration of poverty during the 1970s followed by an increase in the 1980s. In Los Angeles, Riverside, and San Diego the surge in concentrated poverty continued through the 1990s before falling back between 2000 and 2010. In Phoenix and San Francisco, however, the upward trend flattened from 1990 through 2010.

FIGURE 45 ABOUT HERE

Despite the foregoing gyrations, in all years save 2000 Phoenix displayed the highest concentration of Latino poverty and San Francisco the lowest. The poverty isolation index in Phoenix fell from 26.5 to 20.3 between 1970 and 1980, rose to 31.8 in 1990, and then trended slowly downward to a value of 29.2 in 2010. San Francisco initially displayed a low and falling concentration of Latino poverty, with the index dropping from 16.7 to 13.3 from 1970 to 1980. During the 1980s, however, the index rose to 20.5 and then increased slightly to 21.8 in 2000 before dropping back to 20.2 in 2010.

Although Los Angeles experienced the sharpest drop in the concentration of poverty between 1970 and 1980, going from 21.9 to 14.2, thereafter the index then rose to a value of 32.6 in 2000 (the highest value on the chart) before falling to 24.6 in 2010. Riverside and San Diego displayed a similar though less extreme pattern of ups and downs, with the poverty isolation index in the former area falling from 18.5 to 16.6 between 1970 and 1980, rising to 29.8 in 2000, and then falling back to 23.3 in 2010. In San Diego the index dropped from 19.9 to 16.6 between 1970 and 1980, rose to 30.2 in 2000, and then fell to 22.2 in 2010. In all five cases, the concentration of Latino poverty was higher in 2010 than in 1970 and all isolation indices were in the high range.

Figure 46 shows trends in poverty concentration for Latinos in other metropolitan areas of the West. Overall, the trends are basically the same as those observed in the prior graph: falling during the 1970s, rising during the 1980s, and declining modestly during the early 2000s. Latino poverty isolation indices generally reached their minimum values in 1980 (with the index ranging from 10.7 in Portland to 20.9 in Denver) and their maximum values either in 1990 (with a range going from 22.5 in Seattle to 36.2 in Tucson) or 2000 (with a range going from 22.9 in Portland to 37.6 in Fresno) before retreating somewhat in 2010 (yielding a range going from 20.0 in Seattle to 32.8 in Tucson). In general, Seattle and Portland displayed the lowest concentrations of poverty throughout the period of observation while Tucson and Fresno exhibited the highest. Whereas poverty isolation indices were mostly in the low range at or below 20 in the 1980s by 2010 they were all in the high range at or above 20.

FIGURE 46 ABOUT HERE

Turning to the upper end of the socioeconomic spectrum, Figure 47 shows trends in the spatial concentration of Latino affluence in the five largest metropolitan Latino communities, where affluence is defined by a family income at least four times the poverty line for a family of four. In contrast to trends in the concentration of poverty, the concentration of affluence generally moved upward during the 1970s, persisted at a high level during the 1980s and 1990s,

and then rose further upward after 2000. Across all five areas and in all five years, the concentration of Latino affluence is always greater than the concentration of Latino poverty. Just has U.S. society itself has become more unequal though outsized gains at the top of the income distribution, the nation's metropolitan geography has grown more polarized by sharp increases in the degree to which high-income families are able to concentrate themselves within affluent neighborhoods (Massey and Rugh 2021).

FIGURE 47 ABOUT HERE

Perhaps unsurprisingly, in the tech-heavy and expensive San Francisco metropolitan area, Latinos consistently experienced the highest concentration of affluence, with the affluence isolation index rising from 34.3 in 1970 to 42.5 in 1980, declining slightly to 41.1 and 39.3 in 1990 and 2000, and then rising back up to 48.0 in 2010. In this metropolitan area, therefore, the average poor Latino lived in a neighborhood where a fifth of the families were also poor, but the average affluent Latino lived in a neighborhood where almost half of the families were also affluent, emblematic of the contrast in social environments experienced by those at the bottom and top of the income distribution.

At four of the five census dates, the concentration of Latino affluence was lowest in Phoenix, with the isolation index rising from 22.9 to 26.8 during the 1970s, sliding back to 24.6 during the 1980s and 1990s, and then rising to 34.3 in 2010. We observe roughly the same pattern in Los Angeles. There, the concentration of Latino affluence rose from 30.5 to 34.2 during the 1970s, dropped from 34.2 to 26.8 during the 1980s and 1990s, and then rose to 37.4 by 2010. In Riverside and San Diego, the initial increase in concentration persisted beyond the 1970s into the 1980s before falling back in the 1990s, and then jumping up to values of 39.8 and 41.2 in 2010.

As shown in Figure 48, the same basic pattern of change over time prevailed in other metropolitan areas of the West, with sharp increases in the concentration of Latino affluence during the 1970s, followed by reductions during the 1980s that in five cases persisted into the 1990s, ending with another sharp increase across all areas during the 2000s. Once again, a tech-heavy metropolitan area, Seattle, displayed the highest concentration of Latino affluence throughout the period, while the more traditional Mexican communities Tucson and Fresno evinced the lowest concentrations. As of 2010, the affluence isolation index for Latinos stood at 44.4 in Seattle, 39.4 in Denver, around 36.0 in both Portland and Salt Lake, followed by Albuquerque at 32.7, Fresno at 31.1, and Tucson at 29.9.

FIGURE 48 ABOUT HERE

Factors Affecting Latino Segregation

Historically, segregation levels have varied by level of income, city-suburban residence, country of birth, and race. We begin our consideration of this variation with Figure 49, which shows Latino-White segregation indices computed separately by income quintile in 2010 for the largest metropolitan Latino communities of the West. The resulting plots reveal little tendency for Latino segregation to decline as income rises in these large MSAs. Indeed, we observe a

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bump upward between the first and second quintiles in four of the five metro areas followed by a decline between the second to the third quintiles with a flat trend across the fourth and fifth quintiles. No matter what the income level, in these metropolitan areas Latino-White segregation remains in the low to moderate range, with little sign of a decline as income rises.

FIGURE 49 ABOUT HERE

Looking at Latinos in other metropolitan areas of the West in Figure 50, we observe more variation both across areas and income levels. In Portland, Latino-White segregation falls steadily from the first to fourth quintile, going from a high index value of 77.0 to one of 41.2 before bumping up slightly to 45.7 in the fifth quintile. Although the segregation of Latinos increases from the first to the second quintile in Seattle, Salt Lake, and Denver, in each case segregation declines moving from the second to the third quintile, dropping from 58.8 to 40.2 in Seattle, from 54.5 to 40.9 in Salt Lake, and from 53.7 to 38.3 in Denver. Although these declines flatten out or reverse in the fourth and fifth quintiles, segregation nonetheless remains below that observed in the first and second quintiles, indicating a process of greater residential integration as income rises.

FIGURE 50 ABOUT HERE

In contrast, in Tucson Latino-White segregation rises from the first to the third quintiles persists at a high level in the fourth and fifth quintiles. In Fresno segregation rises slightly from the first to second quintile, declines from the second to third quintile and then drops incrementally in the fourth and fifth quintiles. As in Fresno, Latino-White segregation also rises from the first to second quintile and falls between the second and third quintiles and flattens out in the fourth and fifth quintiles. Comparing the bottom to top quintile, we see that in 2010 Latino segregation declined with rising income in Portland, Seattle, Salt Lake, and Denver but increased with rising income in Fresno, Tucson, and Denver. Income thus seems to have different effects on Latino segregation in different metropolitan areas.

Historically, levels of racial-ethnic segregation tend to be lower in suburbs than in central cities. As a result, the degree of a group's suburbanization affects the degree of residential segregation it experiences (see Massey and Tannen 2018). Figure 51 shows trends in the percentage of Latinos who reside in suburbs in the West's largest metropolitan Latino communities. The degree of suburbanization increased between 1970 and 2010 in all five areas and at all dates was greatest in Riverside and least in Phoenix, with San Diego, San Francisco, and Los Angeles falling in-between.

FIGURE 51 ABOUT HERE

The increase in Latino suburbanization was constant across the decades in San Diego and San Francisco, both of which moved from about 39% of Latinos living in suburbs in 1970 to 54% in 2010. In Riverside, the increase was constant from 1980 onward, rising from 52.3% in that year to 62.1% in 2010. The trends were uneven in Los Angles and Phoenix, with early increases between 1970 and 1980 followed by two decades of decline and then a final increase

after 2000. As of 2010, 48.6% of Latinos in Los Angeles and 34.1% of those in Phoenix lived in the suburbs, 2.7 and 8.7 points above their 1970 levels.

Figure 52 presents trends in the suburbanization of Latinos in other metropolitan areas of the West. With the exception of Fresno, Latinos in these areas steadily became more suburbanized over the four decades from 1970 to 2010, though they began from very different starting points. In 1970, Fresno displayed the highest level of suburbanization, with 58% of Latinos reporting a suburban residence. In the ensuing years, however, this share steadily declined decade by decade to a level of just 43.4% in 2010, bucking the overall trend toward greater suburbanization. In contrast, Salt Lake went from the second highest Latino suburbanization rate of 47.6% in 1970 to display by far the highest rate of 74.1% in 2010.

FIGURE 52 ABOUT HERE

The lowest rates of Latino suburbanization in both 1970 and 2010 prevailed in Albuquerque and Tucson. At the former date, just 4.0% of Albuquerque's Latino population resided outside the central city, and in Tucson the figure was only 17.4%. Although Latinos in both metro areas progressively suburbanized over the ensuing decades, the rate of change was greater in Albuquerque and both areas arrived at roughly the same level of 26% in 2010, well below the next highest cluster of MSAs with suburbanization rates in the 40s. Over the decades, Latinos in Denver went from 21.0% to 41.3% living in suburbs while among those in Portland the figure rose from 21.2% to 42.4% in suburbs. Latinos in Seattle began at a higher level of suburbanization in 1970, with 42.9% living in suburbs, but the increase over time was modest, reaching 47.7% in 2010.

Figure 53 shows the effect of suburban residence on the degree of segregation experienced by Latinos in metropolitan areas throughout the West, both the largest and the others. In most areas, the degree of Latino-White segregation was lower in suburbs than cities in 2010, as expected. The city-suburb gap was largest in Phoenix (with a dissimilarity index of 54.7 in the city versus 39.7 in the suburbs), followed by Salt Lake (54.0 vs. 39.3), San Diego (55.9 vs. 42.4), Albuquerque (39.2 vs. 28.3), and San Francisco (54.2 vs. 45.6). The gap was more modest in Tucson (46.8 vs. 40.3), Seattle (34.3 vs. 29.8), and Denver (49.6 vs. 45.6), and virtually nonexistent in Los Angeles (62.3 vs. 61.9). In three cases, segregation was greater in the suburbs than in the city: Riverside (37.9 vs. 44.2), Fresno (41.7 vs. 53.0) and Portland (32.6 vs. 35.9).

FIGURE 53 ABOUT HERE

When they arrive in the United States, immigrants do not settle randomly in the urban landscape but instead follow social connections to other immigrants from the same origin nation, and often the same town or region, who had arrived earlier, leading to the formation of ethnic enclaves dominated by immigrants and their children (Massey et al. 1987). However, children born and raised in the United States tend to move more widely in urban society and display less of a tendency to concentrate in enclaves when they reach adulthood, yielding a pattern of residential integration across the generations (Massey and Denton 1985).

Figure 54 shows indices of dissimilarity computed for foreign-born and native-born Latinos in metropolitan Latino communities of the West. Without exception, in every area shown we observe a decline in the degree of Latino-White segregation moving from the first to the second generation. The drop in the dissimilarity index ranges from 24 points in Albuquerque to around nine points in Los Angeles, with an average decline of 14.6 points, signaling a clear process of residential incorporation among native-born Latinos. Across the two generations, segregation moved from a high to moderate level in Los Angeles, and Phoenix, and Denver was already moderate in the first generation and moved even lower in the second generation.

FIGURE 54 ABOUT HERE

Prior work has generally also found a reduction in residential segregation by race as one moves from Black to mixed to White racial categories, especially among Latinos originating in the Caribbean (Denton and Massey 1989). Although the same pattern holds for persons of Mexican origin, persons of African descent are rare in the Mexican population. Those who report racially mixed origins are likely mestizos of European and Indigenous ancestry rather than persons of European and African ancestry (Massey and Denton 1992). As we have seen, in most metropolitan areas of the West Latinos remain overwhelmingly of Mexican origin, with few reporting origins in the Caribbean, mostly Puerto Ricans with tiny numbers of Dominicans and Cubans.

Although Figure 55 presents dissimilarity indices computed for Black as well as Mixed Race and White-identified Latinos, showing the expected high degree of Black segregation, this finding should not be taken too seriously given the very small number of Black Latinos in the West. When the number of group members is small relative to the number of neighborhoods in a metro area, the dissimilarity index tends to inflate as an artifact of that low ratio. The distinction between mixed and White origins is more meaningful, though as noted earlier the measurement of race among Latinos is conceptually and methodologically problematic.

FIGURE 55 ABOUT HERE

Bearing these caveats in mind, we see that Black-identified Latinos always display the highest level of segregation and White-identified Latinos the lowest level of segregation from Non-Hispanic Whites, with racially mixed Latinos falling in-between. The differential between the racially mixed and White categories averages 9.2 points overall, but ranges from small gaps of just 1.1, 2.8, and 4.5 points in San Diego, Phoenix, and Fresno to highs of 18.2, 16.3. and 12.3 in Portland, Albuquerque, and Seattle, respectively. In Los Angeles, the differential is 7.2 points, but both the mixed and White categories have indices were nonetheless in the high range (67.8 for those reporting a racially mixed identity and 60.6 for those identifying as White). The least segregated metropolitan area in 2010 was Albuquerque, with dissimilarity indices of 32.1 for White Latinos and 48.5 among those reporting a racially mixed origin.

Figure 56 completes our descriptive analysis of factors that influence the level of segregation by considering national origin, focusing specifically on a comparison of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. With two exceptions, Mexicans were less segregated than Puerto Ricans. In Los Angeles the reverse was true: the dissimilarity index was 64.3 for Mexicans and 59.2 for

Puerto Ricans. In San Diego, the two groups experienced the same degree of segregation, with a common index value of 52.0.

In the remaining metro areas Puerto Ricans are always more segregated than Mexicans, but the gap is moderate (under ten points) in Riverside, San Francisco, Phoenix, Denver, and Tucson. The gap is greatest at almost 24 points in Portland (66.2 for Puerto Ricans versus 42.3 for Mexicans) and in five cases the dissimilarity index for Puerto Ricans exceeds 60-point threshold (in addition to Portland, these areas include Denver, Fresno, Salt Lake, and Seattle). However, these high levels of segregation likely reflect, at least in part, the relatively small number of Latinos of Puerto Rican origin in Western metropolitan areas.

FIGURE 56 ABOUT HERE

Multivariate Analysis of Segregation and Isolation

In reality the foregoing variables do not affect segregation independently of one another, but instead act simultaneously and in combination with other metropolitan characteristics to determine the level of segregation. Following the procedure followed in reports on the Latino population in the other census regions, Figure 57 summarizes the results of an ordinary list squares regression model estimated from a common set of independent variables. The dataset contains information on the 52 MSAs located in the West Census Region taken from a larger dataset compiled by Rugh and Massey (2012).

FIGURE 57 ABOUT HERE

The bar graph in Figure 57 presents standardized regression coefficients for predictor variables used in the analysis. These include characteristics of the Latino population (share of the total population, percentage foreign born, percentage suburban, percentage undocumented, percentage nonwhite, segregation between poor and affluent Latinos, and ratio of Latino-to-White income) as well as structural characteristics of the MSA (population size, extent to which suburbs impose restrictive density zoning, median year of home construction, and the degree of anti-Latino prejudice). The latter variable was measured using Google search frequencies on illegal immigrants or illegal immigration tabulated by MSA, which Rugh and Massey (2012) found predicted Latino segregation nationwide

The R^2 for the regression equation underlying the coefficients shown in the figure is 0.78. meaning that variables in the model explain 78% of cross-metropolitan variation in Latino-White segregation. Five indicators stand out as statistically significant. Their standardized coefficients tell us that Latino-White segregation is positively predicted by the percentage Latino in the MSA (with a standardized coefficient of 0.443), the percentage foreign born among Latinos (0.385), MSA population size (0.306), and the degree to which poor Latinos are segregated from affluent persons (0.227). In contrast, Latino segregation is negatively predicted by the degree to which restrictive density zoning prevails in an MSA's suburbs (-0.228).

The first four effects are expected. The minority threat hypothesis argues that as the relative size of minority group increases, members of the majority group perceive a growing

35

symbolic and material threat that leads to greater prejudice and discrimination and hence, more segregation (Blalock 1967). Spatial assimilation theory argues that the segregation of Latino immigrants will be greater than that of native-born Latino (Alba and Nee 2003). Human ecology has long observed that the propensity for spatial segregation increases as cities grow larger (Massey 2005). Finally, whenever a minority group is poorer, on average, than the majority group, class segregation and ethnoracial segregation are necessarily intercorrelated.

The negative coefficient associated with suburban density restrictiveness is unexpected, however, as both theory and research suggest that it causally drives both class and racial segregation upward (Rothwell and Massey 2009, 2010). This anomaly likely reflects the fact that in the West region suburban zoning regimes more tolerant of density than in other regions, particularly the Northeast and Midwest, reducing the range of variation that variable has to potentially explain variation in Latino-White segregation.

Figure 58 presents standardized regression coefficients predicting the spatial isolation of Latinos across metropolitan areas of the West. As already mentioned, spatial isolation occurs when a high degree of unevenness in the residential distribution coincides with a high percentage of Latinos. This fact is confirmed in the figure, which shows that the spatial isolation is determined primarily by these two variables, with the largest effect being the share of Latinos in the metropolitan area (with standardized coefficient of 0.790) rather than the unevenness of their residential distribution relative to Whites (0.269). The spatial isolation of Latinos is also given a small but significant boost in areas with elevated anti-Latino sentiment. No other variables are significant. With an R^2 of 0.99, these three variables thus explain almost all the cross-metropolitan variance in Latino spatial isolation.

FIGURE 58 ABOUT HERE

The degree of residential segregation and spatial isolation are important in determining the status and wellbeing of Latinos because of the role they play in concentrating poverty and affluence spatially, thus creating disadvantaged neighborhoods for the poor and advantaged neighborhoods for the rich. Turning to the concentration of Latino poverty in 2010, Figure 59 shows that it four variables are significant. In this case, they account for 85% of the inter-metropolitan variation in the spatial isolation of poor Latinos.

FIGURE 59 ABOUT HERE

The most important predictor of Latino poverty concentration is the Latino poverty rate itself (with standardized coefficient of 0.926). The more people in poverty there are in a metropolitan area, the greater the incentive for the affluent to exclude them and their social problems by isolating them in different neighborhoods, a process that can easily be accomplished by ethnoracial exclusion whenever the group in question has a high poverty rate. Hence the Latino isolation index also significantly predicts the concentration of Latino poverty (0.371), as does the degree of segregation (residential dissimilarity) between poor Latinos and the affluent (0.334). Paradoxically, a high ratio of Latino to White income increases the degree to which Latino poverty is concentrated, suggesting that a high rate of Latino poverty may provide

incentives for Latinos who do have access to a high income to seek more advantaged neighborhoods outside of the barrio.

Finally, in Figure 60 we show standardized regression coefficients predicting the spatial concentration of Latino affluence. Parallel to what we observed in the prior figure, the most important predictor of concentrated affluence is the rate of Latino affluence itself (with a standardized coefficient of 0.905). The existence of relatively more affluent Latinos thus appears to facilitate their banding together to join other affluent people in moving to advantaged neighborhoods. However, the significant coefficient associated with the Latino isolation index (-0.242) suggests that segregation hampers upward residential mobility. At the same time, in a mirror image of the prior finding that a high Latino-White income ratio *increases* the concentration of Latino poverty, it also serves to *decrease* the concentration of Latino affluence (-0.194).

FIGURE 60 ABOUT HERE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The West was the last of the nation's our Census Regions to cohere and become part of the United States. Its vast territory came into U.S. possession by means of treaties, purchases, and congressional legislation, often backed up by the use or threat of force. The territory was subdivided into states that entered the union at different historical moments, beginning with California in 1850 and ending with Hawaii and Alaska in 1959. The bulk of the territory was ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 at the end of the Mexican American War, bringing two populations of people who today would be labeled Latinos under U.S. governance.

These two populations of proto-Latinos were located in New Mexico, where Spanish colonization and settlement began in 1598, and California, where Spanish colonization and settlement did not begin until 1769, 171 years later. The presence of Latinos in the West thus predates the formation of the United States which began with the Declaration of Independence in 1776 and was finally achieved in 1783 when Britain officially recognized American independence. Mexican independence began somewhat later with a revolt launched in 1810, and it was not fully achieved 1821. At the point of U.S. annexation in 1848, therefore, the Spanish speaking inhabitants of California and Mexico had only been "Mexicans" for 27 years.

These 27 years constituted 52% of the time since Spanish settlement had begun in California, but a mere 11% of New Mexico's time as a Spanish-speaking community. Both before and after annexation, the Spanish speaking inhabitants of New Mexico were consequently more likely to identify as Hispanos—the descendants of Spanish forebearers—than Mexicans. In addition, at the time of annexation these people constituted the overwhelming majority of the non-Indigenous population in New Mexico. In contrast, after annexation Spanish speakers in California quickly became a minority. In the 1850 U.S. Census, 98% of New Mexico's 62,000 would today be classified as Latinos compared to just 16% of California's residents. Moreover, while Latinos remained a majority population in New Mexico throughout the five decades from 1850 to 1900, in California the Latino percentage fell to just 3.9% by 1900.

Thus, identity formation among Latinos in New Mexico and California occurred under very different structural circumstances. In the former state, Latinos became U.S. citizens as a large, well-established, majority population that retained political power, owned property, and controlled key societal institutions. They identified themselves as Spanish and primarily of European descent, in opposition to the indigenous Pueblo communities rather than the small population of Anglo Americans. In contrast, the Spanish speaking population of California constituted a small, inchoate minority of recently arrived Mexicans tied to a failing mission system quickly being eclipsed by the political institutions of statehood. They tended to identify themselves as Mexicans in opposition to the rapidly growing population of Anglo Americans who dominated the state's social, economic, and political structures, and not the indigenous hunters and gatherers who were rapidly dying out. Aside from a small number of elite Mexican landholders, the population mostly consisted poor mestizo settlers connected to the recently established system of missions and pueblos who were treated as racialized inferiors by the White majority.

After 1850, Latino populations in the West grew slowly, with little immigration from south of the Mexico-U.S. border, even as the White population grew rapidly through the arrival of White internal and international migrants. As the total population of the West grew from 178,000 in 1850 to 7.1 million in 1910, the share of Latinos dropped from 42.6% to 4.7%. After 1910, Mexican immigration began to rise, accelerated during the 1920s, and increasingly focused on California. Between 1910 and 1930 the West's Latino population grew from 336,000 to 903,000; its Latino percentage rose from 4.7% to 7.3%; and the share residing in California jumped from 32% to 52% as the share in New Mexico slid from 34% to 19%.

Mexican immigration came to a halt with the onset of the Great Depression in late 1929, prompting a deportation campaign that forcibly removed some 450,000 Mexicans between 1929 and1936, flattening Mexican population growth throughout the region. With U.S. entry into the Second World War, immigration was revived through a temporary worker agreement with Mexico known as the Bracero Program, which expanded after the war to peak at 445,000 workers in 1956 before being phased out and terminated at the end of 1964, prompting many employers to sponsor the legal immigration of their workers. Beginning in 1940 and accelerating exponentially in the 1950s and 1960s, the Latino population of California pulled away from that in other Western states.

After 1950, Latino populations in Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico also began to grow and after 1970 increasingly joined California in pulling away from the pack. Much of population increase after 1970 occurred through unauthorized migration, for in addition to terminating the Bracero Program at the end of 1964, in 1965 it imposed the first-ever numerical limits on legal immigration from nations in the Western Hemisphere. Initially undocumented migration from Mexico remained overwhelmingly circular, with migrants annually moving back and forth across the border and the undocumented population living north of the border grew slowly.

Undocumented population growth began to accelerate after 1980, when the U.S. launched a forceful political and military intervention in Central America seeking to oust the leftist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua while working to suppress leftist mobilizations in El Salvador,

Guatemala, and Honduras. The resulting violence and economic chaos unleashed waves of people fleeing the region. Although Nicaraguans were allowed to enter and adjust status to become legal permanent residents, this option was not open to migrants fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, so these migrants entered without authorization but did not return regularly in the manner of Mexicans (Massey, Durand and Pren 2014).

Rates of return migration by Mexicans began to decline after passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986. IRCA launched an unprecedented militarization of the Mexico-U.S. border, which accelerated in the 1990s to drive up both the financial costs and physical risks of clandestine border crossing. Mexican migrants adapted to the rising costs and risks, not by staying Mexico but by remaining longer in the United States. Over time, the rate of return migration back to Mexico plummeted and the net volume of undocumented in-migration increased to accelerate undocumented population growth (Massey Durand, and Pren 2016).

From 1988 to 2008 the size of the undocumented population increased from two million to 12 million persons, 61% of whom were Mexicans with another 11% being Central Americans from El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker 2009). Initially border militarization targeted the San Diego and El Paso sectors, channeling migrant flows into the Sonoran Desert along the border with Arizona, increasing the traffic into and through that state. From 1990 to 2008, Arizona's undocumented population rose from 88,000 to 560,000.

Beginning in 2000 undocumented migration from Mexico began to slow, and from 2008 to 2018 the net flow turned negative, with more undocumented migrants returning to Mexico than arriving in the United States. During this time migration from Central America continued apace and then accelerated. Whereas the number of undocumented residents from Mexico increased by 50% from 2000 to 2008 it fell by 23% between 2008 and 2018. In contrast, the number undocumented residents from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras rose in both periods, increasing by 32% from 2000 to 2008 and by 55% from 2008 to 2018 (Baker 2021). As of 2018, a third of all undocumented residents lived in the West (Warren 2020).

The militarization of the San Diego sector channeled undocumented migrants away from California toward new states of destination throughout the United States (Massey and Capoferro 2008). Latino population growth began to take off in Washington, Nevada, Oregon, and Nevada in 1970 and accelerated after 1990, especially in Washington and Nevada, with the former moving past New Mexico to house the fourth largest Latino population with 1.1 million Latino residents in 2020. In that same year, Nevada reached 890,000 Latino residents while Oregon and Utah reached 589,000 and 493,000 residents, respectively. Idaho's Latino population began to rise in 1990 and by 2020 reached 239,000 as Hawaii climbed more slowly to 138,000 residents while the Latino populations of Alaska, Montana, and did not exceed 60,000 persons.

In terms of demographics, Latinos in the West have grown steadily older since 1970, with the mean age rising from 25.7 in that year to 34.0 in 2020 as fertility fell and the share never married increased. Although changes in the census questions on race and Hispanic origin make it difficult to interpret trends, by 2020 80% of Latinos chose to identify themselves racially as nonwhite. Throughout the five decades from 1970 to 2020 Mexicans dominated the West's Latino population, constituting 77% of the total in 2020, followed by Other Latinos at 9.3%,

Central Americans at 7.8%, South Americans at 3.0%, Puerto Ricans at 2.2%, Cubans at 0.9%, and 0.3% for Dominicans. Compared to other census regions, Caribbean-origin Latinos are substantially underrepresented in the West.

Data on year of arrival in the United States revealed a burst of immigration into the West in 1980 and 1990, with a slowdown in 2000 and another burst in 2020. This pattern was characteristic particularly of Central Americans, South Americans, Dominicans and to a lesser extent Mexicans. Over the five decades, immigration transformed the West's Latino population from one dominated by aging second-generation immigrants and young third-generation immigrants to one dominated by first-generation immigrants and their young native-born children. Consistent with these trends the use of Spanish in the home surged in 1980 and remained high through 2020, especially among Central Americans, South Americans, and Mexicans.

From 1980 onwards rates of U.S. citizenship generally increased and reached high levels above 70% among all groups in 2020. Although rates of voter registration lagged for most groups from 1996 through 2012, thereafter they surged upward and reached rates of 70% and above in 2020. Among those registered to vote, the share voting rose to high levels during the elections of 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012, but fell somewhat in 2016 and 2017. Whereas voting rates ranged from 85% to 95% across groups in 2012, by 2020 the range went only from 62% to 79%.

Education levels among Latino adults aged 25 and over steadily rose between 1970 and 2020. The share of Latinos with less than a high school education steadily fell as the proportions with some college and at least four years of college increased. The share of college graduates increased most rapidly for South Americans, followed by Dominicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Other Latinos. Although the share completing college also increased over time among Central Americans and Mexicans, as of 2020 they continued to lag well behind other groups with rates 16.4% and 14.5% respectively, compared to a range from 25.5 to 43% with South Americans at the top and Other Latinos at the bottom.

Whereas the labor force participation rate for males declined from 85.4% in 1970 to 75.3% in 2020, among females the participation rate increased from 38.2% to 64.3%. Unemployment rates increased for all groups and for both genders in 2010 in the wake of the Great Recession. Mexican and Central American women additionally experienced a surge of unemployment in 1990. The occupational status of Latinos generally rose from 1970 to 2020 but remained in the modest range. The median household income for Latinos was fairly flat from 1970 to 2010 and then rose substantially in 2020, a pattern generally followed by all groups. Whether this increase is real or an artifact of an undercount among lower-income Latinos in the 2020 American Community Survey is difficult to discern. Consistent with these trends, however, poverty rates fell from 2010 to 2020.

Home ownership rates fluctuated from 1970 through 2010 but ended up in a range that varied from 45% to 60% in 2020. The median value of homes owned generally rose from 1970 to 1990, fell in 2000, and then surged to record high levels in 2020. Multiplying the share of homeowners by the value of their homes yields a rough measure of potential wealth in the form

of home equity. On this measure, potential wealth was greatest for South Americans ($267,000), Cubans ($248,000) and least for Mexicans ($182,000) and Central Americans ($197,000) with Puerto Ricans, Dominicans and Other Latinos falling in-between with respective figures of $221,000, $220,000, and $207,000).

As of 2020, 23 metropolitan areas in California had come to house Latino populations of 35,000 or more, led by Los Angeles with just over six million, followed by Riverside at 2.4 million, San Diego at 1.1 million and San Francisco at 1.0 million. Four more metro areas had Latino populations in the 400,000-500,000 range (Fresno, Sacramento, Bakersfield, and San Jose), followed by five others in the 200,000-400,000 range (Oxnard, Stockton, Visalia, Modesto, and Salinas) and five more in the 100,00-200,000 range (Merced, El Centro, Yuma, Vallejo, and Santa Rosa). Five other metro areas had Latino populations the 30,000-100,000 range (Madera, San Luis Obispo, Yuba City, Napa, and Chico). The central role played by Mexican workers in California's agrarian sector is indicated by the large number of Latinos living metro areas located in the state's agricultural regions.

Another 25 non-Californian metropolitan areas in the West also had Latino populations of 30,000 or more in 2020, led by Phoenix, Las Vegas, and Denver with respective populations of 1.6 million, 754,000 and 750,000, followed by Seattle (454,000), Albuquerque (430,000), Tucson (397,000), and Portland (317,000). Seven other metropolitan areas had populations in the 100,000-300,000 range and 11 more fell into the rage between 30,000 and 100,000. Ten of California's metropolitan areas were majority Latino in 2020, mostly in agricultural centers such as El Centro, Merced, Visalia, Madera, Bakersfield, Salinas, Hanford, Fresno, Modesto, and Stockton). Only four metropolitan areas outside of California were majority Latino in 2020: Las Cruces, Yuma, Santa Fe, and Yakima. Among California's metropolitan areas Chico evinced the lowest Latino percentage at 16.5% and outside of California, Spokane displayed the lowest at just 6.0%.

Across all 23 metropolitan areas of California that contained significant Latino populations, Mexicans constituted a majority, with the Mexican share ranging from 62.0% in San Francisco and 74% in Los Angeles up to values of 90% or more in agricultural centers such as El Centro, Fresno, Hanford, Merced, Modesto, and Visalia. In metropolitan areas outside of California, most were majority Mexican, but we do observe more diversity in them. Only the agricultural centers of Wenatchee, Yakima, and Yuma were more than 90% Mexican and in three cases Mexicans constituted a minority, with percentages of just 27.5% in Honolulu, 46.2% in Santa Fe, and 48.6% in Anchorage. Other Latinos constitute the largest group in Santa Fe and Anchorage, whereas in Honolulu the largest group is Puerto Rican.

Historically, Los Angeles was the first metropolitan area to experience rapid Latino population growth beginning in 1920, followed in 1930 by Denver, Fresno, and Albuquerque, in 1950 by San Francisco. By 1960, San Diego, Phoenix, and Riverside had joined the ranks of MSAs with a rapidly growing Latino population, and in 1970 they were joined by Seattle. Portland, and Salt Lake. After an initial burst of growth in Honolulu during the 1970s and 1980s petered out during the 1990s, its Latino population began to rise again after 2000, joining Boise which took off in 1990. The Latino population of Anchorage began to grow in 1980 but rose rather slowly through 2020.

With the exception of Los Angeles, Latino-White segregation indices fell mostly in the moderate range of 30-160 over the five decades from 1970 to 2020. Over this period, Latino segregation in Los Angles rose from an index value of 47.5 in 1970 to 61.0 in 2020, compared to 2020 index values of 46 to 47 in San Francisco, Phoenix, and San Diego. As of 2020 Latino-White dissimilarity indices ranged from 39 to 45 in Riverside, Albuquerque, Denver, Tucson, and Fresno, and from 30 to 32 in Salt Lake, Seattle, and Portland.

Owing to the rapid increase the share of Latinos in many metropolitan areas of the West, levels of spatial isolation rose sharply in many cases, yielding Latino isolation indices of 60 in Riverside, 63 in Fresno, and 64 in Los Angeles. These high values were followed closely by values of 56 in Albuquerque 50 in Tucson, 48 in San Diego, 46 in Phoenix, and then by more modest values of 37 in Denver and 32 in San Francisco, and finally by the low values of 29 in Salt Lake, 19 in Portland, and 15 in Seattle.

Data on income and poverty are not yet available at the census tract level, so we can only measure trends in the spatial concentration of poverty and affluence through 2010. In general, the concentration of Latino poverty went down from 1970 to 1980, rose after 1980 and with three exceptions remained high through 2010. The three exceptions were Los Angeles, Riverside, and San Diego, in which the poverty isolation index dropped from 33 to 25 in the first case, from 30 to 22 in the second, and from 30 to 22 in the third.

Despite these declines, the concentration of Latino poverty nonetheless remained above the isolation index value of 20 that is customarily interpreted as the lower threshold for a "high" concentration of poverty. Indeed, all of the metropolitan areas we considered had poverty concentration indices at or above this threshold, with values of around 20 in San Francisco and Seattle, 22 to 27 in Salt Lake, Portland, Denver, and Albuquerque, and values of 29 to 33 in Phoenix, Fresno, and Tucson.

The spatial concentration of Latino affluence displayed very different trends over time, rising sharply from 1970 to 1980, stabilizing or declining somewhat from 1980 to 2000, and then moving sharply upward from 2000 to 2010. As of the latter year, Latinos experienced the greatest concentration of affluence in San Francisco, Seattle, San Diego, and Riverside, with respective affluence isolation index values of 48, 44, 41, and 40, all at or above the threshold value of 40 that denotes an "extreme" concentration of affluence. Index values for the other metropolitan areas we considered varied between 30 and 40, the upper half of the "high" range, with scores ranging from 30 in Tucson to 39 in Denver.

We concluded our analysis by considering how levels of Latino segregation in Western metropolitan areas varied by income, suburbanization, birthplace, race, and national origin. Univariate comparisons revealed a mixed picture with respect to income's influence on segregation, with little evidence that Latino-White dissimilarity declined with rising income in Phoenix, Riverside, Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Fresno, Tucson, or Albuquerque. However, we did find sharp declines in Latino-White segregation from the first to the third or fourth quintiles of household income in Portland, Seattle, Salt Lake, and Denver.

The degree of Latino suburbanization varied considerably across metropolitan areas but nonetheless rose everywhere except in Fresno where the share of Latinos residing in suburbs fell

from 58% to 43% over the four decades. As of 2010, the level of Latino suburbanization varied from values of around 26% in Tucson and Albuquerque and 34% in Phoenix to highs of 74% in Salt Lake, 62% in Riverside, and 54% in San Diego and San Francisco, with all other metropolitan areas displaying suburbanization rates in the 40s. In general, levels of Latino-White segregation were lower in suburbs than central cities, except in Riverside, Fresno, and Portland where they were higher. Segregation levels were also lower for native-born than foreign-born Latinos across all metropolitan areas, and they were likewise lower for white than mixed race Latinos and for Mexicans compared with Puerto Ricans, except in Los Angeles where Mexicans were more segregated and San Diego where the levels of segregation were the same.

Multivariate analyses found that Latino-White segregation was positively predicted by an MSA's percentage Latino, the percentage foreign born among Latinos, and higher levels segregation between poor Latinos and affluent persons. The spatial isolation of Latinos was most powerfully predicted by the percentage Latino, followed by the degree of Latino-White segregation and at some distance by the degree of anti-Latino sentiment. The concentration of Latino poverty was most powerfully predicted by the Latino poverty rate, in combination with a high degree of Latino spatial isolation, high Latino incomes relative to Whites, and a high degree of segregation between poor Latinos and the affluent. Finally, a high rate of Latino affluence, but negatively predicted by a high Latino isolation index, and a high ratio of Latino to White average income. In sum. segregation by income race together increase the isolation of Latinos within neighborhoods, which perforce concentrates whatever poverty or affluence exists in the broader Latino population, either to decrease or increase the likelihood of upward socioeconomic mobility by Latinos.

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Figure 1. Growth of Latino population in the West 1970-2015

Figure 2. Percentage of Latinos in states of the West

Figure 3. Latino population in Western states 2020

Figure 4. Percentage of Latinos in Western states in 2020

Figure 5. Growth of Latino population in California and rest of western states

Figure 6. Growth of Latino population in western states other than California

AZ: 2,192,253
1,908,923
1,292,152
CO: 1,263,390
WA: 1,059,213
NM: 1,010,811
NV: 890,257
665,639
735,769
453,500
OR: 588,757
UT: 492,912
NM: 290,007
421,350
204,915
ID: 239,407
HI: 138,293
AK MT WY

Figure 7. Demographic characteristics of Latinos in the West

Figure 8. Racial identity of Latinos in the West.

Figure 9. Origins of Latinos in the West

Other Latinos

2.5
2.8
2.6
1.8
2.1
88.2

South Americans
9.3
3.0

Cubans

Central Americans

75.0

78.7

81.5

Puerto Ricans

7.8
0.9
2.2
76.6

75.7

Mexicans

Percentage (y-axis: 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100)

Year (x-axis: 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020)

Figure 10. Percentage of immigrants who arrived in the prior five years

Cubans 53.0

S. Americans 42.3

37.9

33.3

35.8

C. Americans 31.4

32.1

Other Latinos 28.6

30.3

Mexicans 27.3

31.4

Dominicans 25.0

27.5

26.3

25.3

24.3

22.9

18.5

20.0

18.5

16.4

16.9

18.9

17.4

14.8

15.5

14.8

11.4

12.1

9.7

9.0

7.4

6.4

4.7

Percentage

Year

1960   1970   1980   1990   2000   2010   2020

Figure 11. Percent foreign born among Latinos in different origin groups

Figure 12. Generational composition of Latinos in the West

1970
- 1st Generation 31.4
- 2nd Generation 16.6
- 2.5 Generation 13.5
- 3+ Generation 38.5

1994
- 1st Generation 43.7
- 2nd Generation 21.8
- 2.5 Generation 9.2
- 3+ Generation 25.3

2000
- 1st Generation 43.9
- 2nd Generation 21.8
- 2.5 Generation 8.7
- 3+ Generation 25.7

2010
- 1st Generation 40.70
- 2nd Generation 22.80
- 2.5 Generation 9.10
- 3+ Generation 27.40

2020
- 1st Generation 36.7
- 2nd Generation 23.2
- 2.5 Generation 10.1
- 3+ Generation 29.9

Percentage

Year

Figure 13. Percent of Latino origin groups speaking Spanish at home.

Figure 14. Percent U.S. citizens among Latino origin groups in the West

Mexicans
85.6

Other Latinos
77.8

Dominicans
71.8

Central
Americans
53.7

South
Americans
47.1

Cubans
33.6

92.7

91.7

95.9

93.1
93.0

89.5

87.2

83.6

82.7

83.4
82.1

82.9

75.9

75.7

71.6

70.5

74.7

69.9
69.5

68.4

66.7

63.9

56.5

63.8

50.3

48.5

37.8

34.7

29.9

19.4

Percentage

1970   1980   1990   2000   2010   2020

Year

Figure 15. Percent of Latino origin citizens registered to vote in the West

Figure 16. Percent of registered Latino origin groups in the West who voted

Central/South Americans
88.9

Dominicans
79.9
77.7

Mexicans
73.4

Cubans

63.6

Puerto Ricans

95.2
93.2
84.4
81.5
79.5

91.3
86.3
84.1
82.1

95.3
87.9
85.4

89.8
84.2

93.2
92.1
89.4
86.8

100.0
90.4
89.4
87.8

Percentage

Year

Figure 17. Educational attainment of Latinos in the West

Figure 17. Educational attainment of Latinos in the West

Data points by series:

< High School: 63.7 (1970), 54.7 (1980), 52.8 (1990), 50.8 (2000), 39.4 (2010), 29.9 (2020)

High School: 21.8 (1970), 23.1 (1980), 20.7 (1990), 21.2 (2000), 24.5 (2010), 26.7 (2020)

Some College: 9.8 (1970), 15.6 (1980), 19.3 (1990), 20.0 (2000), 24.3 (2010), 26.1 (2020)

College Graduate: 4.8 (1970), 6.7 (1980), 7.2 (1990), 8.1 (2000), 11.9 (2010), 17.3 (2020)

Y-axis: Percentage (0 to 70)
X-axis: Year (1970 to 2020)

Figure 18. Percent of college graduates among Latino origin groups in the West

South Americans 43.0
36.1
Dominicans 35.4
32.8
Cubans 32.9
28.8
28.2
30.4
25.8
Puerto Ricans
24.8
23.6
25.5
19.8
19.0
19.7
19.0
Other Latinos
26.7
17.5
14.3
17.0
Central Americans
18.2
13.0
12.6
16.4
12.4
10.8
11.2
11.5
14.5
10.2
9.4
10.1
Mexicans
8.0
8.0
9.9
6.7
8.6
4.7
5.5
6.6
3.6
5.3

Percentage

Year

1970   1980   1990   2000   2010   2020

Figure 19. Labor force status of Latino males in the West

Y-axis: Percentage

X-axis: Year

Employed
- 1970: 85.4
- 1980: 82.7
- 1990: 81.4
- 2000: 71.2
- 2010: 74.8
- 2020: 75.3

Not In Labor Force
- 1970: 9.8
- 1980: 11.0
- 1990: 11.8
- 2000: 23.4
- 2010: 15.0
- 2020: 20.0

Unemployed
- 1970: 4.8
- 1980: 6.3
- 1990: 6.9
- 2000: 5.4
- 2010: 10.2
- 2020: 4.7

Figure 20. Labor force status of Latina females in the West

Figure 21. Male unemployment rates for Latino origin groups in the West

Figure 22. Female unemployment for Latino origin groups in the West

Figure 23. Mean Hauser-Warren SEI occupational status scores for Latinos in the West

Figure 24. Mean and median household income for Latinos in the West

Mean Income
$82,924

Median Income
$64,174

$63,587
$62,803
$59,149
$55,799
$53,052
$49,786
$49,000
$48,913
$47,875
$46,051

(Y-axis) Average Income: $0, $10,000, $20,000, $30,000, $40,000, $50,000, $60,000, $70,000, $80,000, $90,000

(X-axis) Year: 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020

Figure 25. Median household incomes for Latino origin groups in the West

Figure 26. Poverty rate for Latino origin groups in the West

Mexicans 21.6

Puerto Ricans 16.4

Cubans 13.8

C. Americans 13.6

S. Americans 12.7

Other Latinos 9.4

21.9
19.9
17.9
15.8
13.7
10.5

23.5
23.2
17.7
16.8
13.0
11.3

22.5
20.3
19.8
14.7
13.0

23.1
19.3
17.2
15.5
12.2
10.8

13.8
13.7
12.4
10.4
9.1

Percent Poor

Year

Figure 27. Percent homeowner for Latino orgin groups in the West

Figure 28. Mean and median value of homes owned by Latinos in the West

Mean Value
$413,228

Median Value
$332,213

$288,905

$247,852

$214,889

$193,452

$204,012

$179,776

$189,256

$217,391

$112,169

$99,266

2015 U.S. Dollars

Year

Figure 29. Median home values for Latino origin groups in the West

Figure 30. Potential home wealth for Latino origin groups in 2020

Figure 31. Latino population of metropolitan areas of California in 2020

Thousands of Latinos (y-axis)

Metropolitan area	Thousands of Latinos
Los Angeles	6,018
Riverside	2,437
San Diego	1,099
San Francisco	1,025
Fresno	526
Sacramento	525
Bakersfield	499
San Jose	478
Oxnard	361
Stockton	352
Visalia	284
Modesto	283
Salinas	265
Merced	181
El Centro	155
Vallejo	123
Santa Rosa	118
Madera	90
San Luis Obispo	64
Yuba City	50
Napa	45
Chico	35

Figure 32. Latino populations of metropolitan areas in other western states in 2020

Figure 33. Percent Latino in metropolitan areas of California in 2020

Figure 34. Percent Latino in metropolitan areas of other western states in 2020

Metropolitan Area	Percent Latino
Las Cruces, NM	69.0
Yuma, AZ	59.4
Santa Fe, NM	53.2
Yakima, WA	53.1
Albuquerque, NM	48.0
Pueblo, CO	46.1
Tucson, AZ	37.3
Las Vegas, NV	32.5
Phoenix, AZ	32.1
Wenatchee, WA	30.7
Denver, CO	24.2
Reno, NV	23.1
Colorado Springs, CO	19.3
Salt Lake City, UT	17.3
Lake Havasu, AZ	15.6
Ogden, UT	14.7
Prescott, AZ	14.3
Boise, ID	14.1
Portland, OR-WA	12.6
Orem, UT	12.2
Seattle, WA	11.3
Honolulu, HI	10.6
Fort Collins, CO	10.5
Eugene, OR	10.2
Anchorage, AK	7.9
Spokane, WA	6.0

Figure 35. Origins of Latinos in Californian metropolitan areas in 2020

Figure 36. Origins of Latinos in other metropolitan areas of the West in 2020

Figure 37. Growth of the four largest metropolitan Latino populations in the West 1900-2020

Figure 38. Changing percent Latino within the four largest metropolitan Latino populations in the West 1900-2020

Figure 39. Growth of Latino populations in selected other metropolitan areas of the West 2020

Number of Latino Residents

749,936

Denver

595,528

Fresno
552,173

526,274

Seattle

Tucson

453,772

Albuquerque

430,398

397,242

395,239

Portland

226,545

173,800

316,657

117,700

224,073

Salt Lake

72,660

Boise 111,081

102,407

46,139

39,178

Honolulu

22,449

35,477

14,738

Anchorage

11,728

7,824

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Axis Title

Figure 40. Percent Latino in selected other metropolitan areas in the West 1900-2020

Figure 41. Latino-White segregation in the West's largest Latino communities 1970-2010

Los Angeles: 43.5, 57.3, 61.1, 63.1, 63.4, 61.0
Phoenix: 47.5, 52.2, 48.6, 52.1, 49.6, 47.1
San Francisco: 36.2, 43.9, 48.3, 50.6, 49.3, 46.1
San Diego: 31.8, 41.8, 45.3, (52.1), (49.6), (47.1)
Riverside: 37.9, 38.1, 35.8, 42.5, 42.4, 42.2

Y-axis: Dissimilarity Index (0.0 – 70.0)
X-axis: Year (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020)

Figure 42. Latino-White segregation in selected other Western metropolitan areas 1970-2010

Figure 43. Spatial isolation of Latinos in the West's largest Latino communities 1970-2010

Figure 44. Spatial isolation of Latinos in other metropolitan areas of the West 1970-2010

Figure 45. Spatial concentration of poverty for Latinos in the West's largest Latino communities 1970-2010

Figure 46. Spatial concentration of poverty for Latinos in other Western metropolitan areas 1970-2010

Figure 47. Spatial concentration of Latino affluence in the West's largest Latino commmunities 1970-2010

Figure 48. Concentration of Latino affluence in other Western metropolitan areas 1970-1910

Figure 49. Latino-White segregation by income quintile in the West's largest Latino communities 2010

Figure 50. Latino-White segregation by income quintile in 2010 in other metropolitan areas of the West

Figure 51. Suburbanization of Latinos in the West's largest metropolitan Latino communities 1970-2010

Figure 52. Suburbanization of Latinos in other metropolitan areas of the West 1970-2020

Figure 53. Latino-White segregation in cities and suburbs of Western metropolitan areas in 2010.

Figure 54. Latino-White segregation by place of birth in 2010

Figure 55. Latino-White segregation of Black, Mixed, and White Latinos in metropolitan areas of the West 2010

Figure 56. Segregation of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans from Whites in metropolitan areas of the West in 2010

Figure 57. Effect of selected variables on Latino-White segregation in the West in 2010 (black=negative effect, *p<0.05)

Figure 58. Effect of selected variables on the Spatial isolation of Latinos in the West in 2010

Figure 59. Effect of selected variables on the spatial concentration of Latino poverty in the West in 2010 (black=negative effect, *P<0.05)

Figure 60. Effect of selected variables on the spatial concentration of Latino affluence in the West in 2010 (black=negative effect, *p<0.05)